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I have had a little something to do with lawyers since the 1955
Montgomery bus boycott.
Martin Luther King, Jr.'
t Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. Many people have generously aided me in writing this
article. First, I would like to thank for his unflagging support Dean James Vorenberg. I would also
like to thank Anita Allen, Scott Brewer, Archibald Cox, Charles Donohue, William Fisher, Morton
Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, Sanford Levinson, Martha Minow, Aviam Soifer, Girardeau Spann,
Cass Sunstein, and David Wilkins. I presented earlier versions of this paper to the Program on Legal
History at Harvard Law School and faculty colloquia at the University of Texas Law School and the
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1. King, Foreword to W. KUNSTLER, DEEP IN My HEART. at xxi (1966).
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INTRODUCTION
Martin Luther King, Jr., demonstrated a keen appreciation for both
the power and the limits of law.2 The movement in which he played such
a central role-the Civil Rights Movement of 1955-1968-produced, as
Harry Kalven, Jr. once quipped, "the first revolution in history con-
ducted, so to speak, on advice of counsel."3 King displayed attentiveness to
legal symbolism in the first speech that he gave as a civil rights leader.
Urging the blacks of Montgomery, Alabama, to boycott the city's buses to
protest racially-motivated mistreatment, he invoked legal and religious
icons to inspire their collective defiance. "We are not wrong," he told his
audience at the Holt Street Baptist Church on the evening of December 5,
1955, because "if we are wrong, the Supreme Court of this nation is
wrong. If we are wrong, the Constitution of the United States is wrong. If
we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong."'
Beginning that evening, and over the next thirteen years, King's activi-
ties placed him at or near the center of controversies that dramatically
altered the nation's legal landscape. From the Montgomery Bus Boycott
arose Gayle v. Browder,5 the Supreme Court decision that invalidated de
jure segregation in intrastate transportation and thereby effectively over-
ruled Plessy v. Ferguson.' Protest campaigns in Birmingham and Selma
constituted crucial links in the chain of events that culminated in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964," the Voting Rights Act of 1965,8 and the Supreme
Court decisions upholding these legislative initiatives. 9
These and related campaigns also gave rise to cases that significantly
affected legal doctrines regulating freedom of expression. King claimed re-
peatedly that "the great glory of American democracy is the right to pro-
2. In an issue of the Columbia Law Review dedicated to Martin Luther King, Jr. soon after his
assassination, the editors aptly noted that for lawyers, King's life and death should have a distinct
significance. Symposium in Memory of Dr. Martin Luther King. Jr., 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1011
(1968); see also Greenberg, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Law, 114 CONG. REc. 17109 (1968)
("The striking thing about Martin King, particularly for his lawyers, is that his life helped determine
the outer reaches, the full potential of law in his time, while simultaneously defining its limits and
disabilities."); McGee, Book Review, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 453 (1988) ("Although [King] was
neither a lawyer nor a judge, surely he belongs in the pantheon of American constitutional giants.").
3. H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 124 (1965).
4. Speech by Martin Luther King, Jr., at Holt Street Baptist Church, Montgomery, Alabama
(December 5, 1955) [hereinafter King Speech], reprinted in EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL
RIGHTS YEARS-A READER AND GUIDE 45 (C. Carson, D. Garrow, V. Harding & D. Hine eds.
1987).
5. 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982)).
8. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
9. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding challenged provisions
of Voting Rights Act); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding
public accommodations provisions of Civil Rights Act).
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test for right.""0 The Civil Rights Movement tested his hypothesis by
staging protest activities that forced courts to create or refine doctrine in-
volving a wide array of First Amendment concerns, including symbolic
speech,"1 the public forum, 2 freedom of association, 3 libel," and rules
governing mass demonstrations.' 5 The disciplined peacefulness of the civil
rights activists and the underlying decency of their demands helped to cre-
ate an atmosphere conducive to judicial liberality. The result was not only
a beneficial transformation in the substantive law of race relations, but
also a blossoming of libertarian themes in First Amendment jurispru-
dence.16 In the context of the First Amendment, as in many other areas,
the struggle for racial justice produced ramifications that extended far be-
yond its point of origin.17 Once loosed, liberty, like equality, was an idea
not easily cabined.' 8
On the other hand, King and his allies suffered significant defeats in
the legislative, executive, and judicial arenas. They were forced to com-
promise on key issues in order to obtain passage of federal civil rights
legislation. 9 Activists discovered that the willingness of Presidents Ken-
nedy and Johnson to invest political capital on behalf of the Movement
often lagged behind their promises.2" And Movement activists failed to
10. King Speech, supra note 4, at 45.
11. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
12. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); H. KALVEN, supra note 3, at 123-72.
13. See Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); H. KALVEN, supra note 3, at 65-121.
14. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
15. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
16. See generally D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 295-427 (1st ed. 1973); H.
KALVEN, supra note 3; Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights, and Civil Dissonance, 77
YALE L.J. 1520 (1968); Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law, 51 VA. L. REV. 785 (1965);
Powell, A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 205 (1966).
17. See D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 51-74 (1987); Freund, The Civil Rights Movement
and the Frontiers of Law, in THE NEGRO AMERICAN 363 (T. Parsons & K. Clark eds. 1965); Kinoy,
The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387, 389 n.6 (1967) ("One of the
most fascinating areas of the evolution of our constitutional law yet to be explored is the catalyzing
effect of the myriad forms of struggle for Negro freedom and equality upon the development of consti-
tutional rights and liberties applicable to all citizens-white and black alike.").
18. Cf Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966).
19. See STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS-PART II (B. Schwartz,
ed. 1970). Professor Schwartz notes, for instance, the evisceration of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, id.
at 837 (it was "so watered down in the Senate as virtually to destroy the statute's substantive im-
pact"); the emasculation of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, id. at 935 (like its predecessor, the 1960 act
was "so weak that its effect upon civil rights was primarily symbolic"); the defeat in Congress in 1966
of efforts to enact national legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in housing, id. at 1629; and the
compromise open-housing measure that was finally enacted in 1968 in the aftermath of Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr.'s assassination.
20. See, e.g., M. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE PoST-Brown SOUTH 70-127 (1987) (criticizing Kennedy ad-
ministration's response to white racially-motivated violence); A. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN
COURT 66-74 (1965) (criticizing Kennedy administration judicial appointments); C. BRAUER, JOHN
F. KENNEDY AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1977); C. CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND
THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960's 123-29 (criticizing President Lyndon Johnson's failure to
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persuade the Supreme Court that racial discrimination in places of public
accommodation violated the federal constitution;21 the outlawing of "pri-
vate" discrimination in businesses open to the public occurred through the
intervention of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,22 a less aggressive law in
certain respects than the Reconstruction-era legislation it was meant to
replace.
Despite the centrality of King's role, it would be erroneous to conflate,
without qualification, his career and the history of the Movement.23 The
Movement consisted of a mass of local initiatives that received inspiration
and guidance from a striking array of figures who, at one time or another,
diverged quite markedly from King. One thinks, for instance, of such vital
leaders as Roy Wilkins, James Farmer, Robert Moses, John Lewis,
Stokely Carmichael, Fred Shuttlesworth, and Fannie Lou Hamer.24 King,
however, is the person most widely identified in the public imagination
with the Civil Rights Movement.25 The Movement would probably have
transformed America without his presence.2" But it is hard to believe that
history's replacement could have offered the eloquence, vision, and moral
gravity that King provided. 7
support Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party at Democratic National Convention in 1964); J.
HARVEY, BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS DURING THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (1973); V. NAVASKY,
KENNEDY JUSTICE (1971).
21. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); see also Paulsen, The Sit-In Cases of 1964:
"But Answer Came There None," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 137 (analyzing Court's avoidance of what was
then "one of this nation's most troublesome constitutional questions: To what extent does the Four-
teenth Amendment forbid the states to support private choice, when under the Constitution that choice
could not be made by the state itself . . .?").
22. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §
1971 (1982)).
23. See D. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 625 (1986); Carson, Civil Rights Reform and the Black Free-
dom Struggle, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 23-27 (C. Eagles ed. 1986); Carson,
Martin Luther King, Jr.: Charismatic Leadership in a Mass Struggle, 74 J. AM. HIST. 448 (1987).
24. See J. FARMER, LAY BARE THE HEART (1985); J. FORMAN, THE MAKING OF BLACK RE-
VOLUTIONARIES (1972); R. WILKINS, STANDING FAST (1982).
25. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 27, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-389, 98 Stat. 1473 (bill creating Martin
Luther King, Jr. Federal Holiday Commission). As Professor Kimberle Crenshaw has noted, King's
birthday has "come to symbolize the massive social movement that grew out of efforts of African-
Americans to end the long history of racial oppression in America." Crenshaw, Race, Reform and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1331, 1332 (1988).
26. During the bus boycott in Montgomery, King declared that if he "had never been born this
movement would have taken place. . . . I just happened to be here. . . . [Tihere comes a time when
time itself is ready for change." Quoted in D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 56.
27. See, e.g., CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE (H. Bedau ed. 1969); REVOLUTION
AND THE RULE OF LAW (E. Kent ed. 1971). Nothing better indicates the extraordinary range of
King's talents than that he participated in the making of the American legal tradition not only as a
civil rights activist but also as an intellectual. His "Letter From A Birmingham Jail," for instance, is
widely anthologized and properly acknowledged as one of the great contributions in this century to the
theory and practice of civil disobedience. See J. ANSBRO, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: THE MAKING
OF A MIND (1982); H. WALTON, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
(1971); Davis, Pride and Prejudice, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 5, 1987 (complaining that "[tihe




This Article focuses upon legal issues that shaped and were in turn
shaped by Martin Luther King's first campaign as a civil rights leader:
the boycott in 1955-1956 of segregated buses in Montgomery, Alabama.
In Section I, I describe the legal status of the Negro in the South in 1955.
This overview portrays the legal and extra-legal situation southern blacks
faced on the eve of the boycott and provides a baseline against which to
measure what King and the Movement accomplished.
In Section II, I describe the origins and early development of the Mont-
gomery Bus Boycott and of the organization that guided it, the Montgom-
ery Improvement Association (MIA), as well as King's entrance into na-
tional prominence as the MIA's president. I emphasize two points in
particular. The first is the striking modesty of the protest's initial de-
mands. Although the boycott began one and a half years after the Su-
preme Court invalidated de jure segregation in public schooling,2 King
and the MIA did not initially demand the abolition of de jure segregation
on Montgomery's buses; they primarily demanded courtesy and formal
even-handedness, taking for granted the continued existence of racial sep-
aration. 9 The second is the considerable extent to which the white power
structure, exemplified by the bus company's attorney, a Harvard-trained
lawyer named Jack Crenshaw, inadvertently radicalized King and the
MIA. Crenshaw stubbornly maintained that the MIA's initial requests
were impossible to satisfy within the confines of existing state and local
law. His reading of the relevant statutes cut off avenues of compromise. In
response, and to many people's surprise, the leaders of the MIA de-
manded more-and won more-than they had originally even
contemplated.
In Section III, I discuss litigation ignited by the boycott. I focus on two
cases in particular. State v. King30 involved King's conviction for violating
an Alabama anti-boycotting statute. I examine his prosecution as a socio-
political event and show how, ironically, it furthered the cause of the pro-
test. I then examine the doctrinal issues raised by the prosecu-
tion-statutory vagueness, selective prosecution, the authority of states to
regulate political boycotts-and relate them to constitutional law as it
stood in 1956 and as it stands today. In the second case, Gayle v. Brow-
der,31 the Supreme Court affirmed a three-judge district court's decision
striking down state and local statutes in Alabama requiring racial segre-
gation aboard intrastate vehicles. I examine the difficulties that faced the
three southern, white judges who had to decide whether to extend Brown,
and the strategy behind the Supreme Court's disposition of the case.
Finally, in Section IV, I explore the achievements of the boycott and its
28. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 151-169.
30. 98 So. 2d 443 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957).
31. 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
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associated litigation. Although I note in some detail the limits of the boy-
cott's short run accomplishments, I conclude by emphasizing the manifold
ways in which, over the long run, the experiences gained, the attention
won, and the inspiration generated by King and his associates strength-
ened a Movement that produced tremendous changes that continue to re-
verberate in our society. Viewed against a backdrop of slightly more than
thirty years, the boycott in Montgomery can rightly be deemed not only
the starting point of Martin Luther King's public career but also, per-
haps, its most impressive moment.
Guiding my analysis of specific events, developments, and problems are
two broad methodological aims. The first is to add a lawyer's vision to the
historical study of the Civil Rights Movement between 1955 and 1968.
During the 1960's, the Movement was the subject of considerable com-
mentary by practicing attorneys and legal academics. 2 Since then, it has
received relatively little attention from the legal community. The most il-
luminating recent studies have mainly consisted of work by historians,
journalists, political scientists, and sociologists.3" I draw upon that work
liberally in the pages that follow and hope that my study will nourish
such undertakings. The reason why reappraisal of the Movement from
the perspective of a legal academic is potentially enlightening is that, all
too often, scholars without legal training either shy away from questions
that appear to require technical legal expertise 4 or neglect topics that are
32. See, e.g., A. Cox, M. HOWE & J. WIGGINS, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
COURTS (1967); H. KALVEN, suprT note 3; LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (D.
King & C. Quick eds. 1965); SOUTHERN JUSTICE (L. Friedman ed. 1965); Pollitt, Dime Store Dem-
onstrations: Events and Legal Problems of the First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315; Powell, supra
note 16.
33. See, e.g., C. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN
TRANSIT (1983); J. BLOOM, CLASS, RACE, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1987); T.
BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (1988); C. CARSON, IN
STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960's (1981); W. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND
CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM
(1980); D. COLBURN, RACIAL CHANGE AND COMMUNITY CRISIS: ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA,
1877-1980 (1985); S. EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT (1979); A. FAIRCLOUGH, To REDEEM THE SOUL
OF AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1987);
D. GARROW, supra note 23; D. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: FROM
"SOLO" TO MEMPHIS (1981); D. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978) [hereinafter PROTEST AT SELMA]; D. MCADAM, FREE-
DOM SUMMER (1988); D. MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK IN-
SURGENCY, 1930-1970 (1982) [hereinafter BLACK INSURGENCY]; A. MEIER & E. RUDWICK, CORE:
A STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1942-1968 (1973); A. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984); R. NORRELL,
REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN TUSKEGEE (1985); H. SrrKOFF,
THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY, 1954-1980 (1981).
34. Cf. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Vriting of American Legal History (Book
Review), 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 275 (1973) ("The study of the history of American law inevitably
involves the mastery of technical legal doctrine, which . . . seems to have left historians paralyzed
with fear."); Rothman, The Promise of American Legal History (Book Review), 2 REV. AM. HIST.
16, 17 (1974) (maintaining that historians often avoid case materials because they find the law "either
too abstruse or too mysterious").
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likely to be of special concern to the legal imagination: the substance and
application of legal doctrine, the relationship between case law at a given
point in the past and prevailing contemporary trends, litigation strategies,
and lawyerly performance.
My second aim is to write about the legal ramifications of the struggle
against segregation without falling victim to either the illusion that what
happened had to happen or the notion that the losing side-the side sup-
porting de jure segregation-was wholly bereft of morality or reason.
Both of these tendencies represent seductive strands of "victor's history"
which, if indulged, obscure important aspects of the past."5 I attempt to
respect segregationists in the sense of taking their ideas seriously; after all,
Martin Luther King did. Some segregationists thought long and hard
about the peculiar form of racial hierarchy they sought to maintain. We
can benefit from attention to their views, particularly their insistence that
segregation represented "a way of life." That conception of segregation is
far more attuned to the fluid, hydra-headed nature of the segregation re-
gime than the static and formalistic conception that has so thoroughly and
unfortunately dominated the legal imagination. 6
I. WHAT MARTIN LUTHER KING WAS Up AGAINST: THE LEGAL
STATUS OF THE SOUTHERN NEGRO IN 1955
At mid-century, as throughout the history of the United States, the ra-
cial subordination of blacks constituted an explosive national problem.
The South, however, was the locus of the most intense and visible racial
struggles. In the 1950's, Southern society was beginning to experience
with increasing severity a sharp tension created by the urgency of black
aspirations and the inertia of the established order.3" In racial terms, the
most striking aspect of the status quo was segregation-the relegation of
blacks on the basis of race to a separate and subordinate sphere in every
arena of social interaction."
35. For writings by interpretive historians that have shaped my thinking on this issue, see B.
BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON vii-xi (1974); E. GENOVESE, IN REx AND BLACK:
MARXIAN EXPLORATIONS IN SOUTHERN AND AFRo-AMERICAN HISTORY 259-374 (1980); R. HOF-
STADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 463-66 (1968).
36. Charles Black's great essay, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960), is an effort to explain segregation as a way of life. For a celebrated article displaying the
narrow and formalistic conception of segregation that remains influential, see Wechsler, Toward Neu-
tral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
37. Useful overviews of the racial crisis that overtook the South in the 1950's include N. BAR-
TLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950'S
(1969); E. BLACK & M. BLACK, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE SoUrTH, 75-125 (1987); J. BLOOM,
supra note 33, at 87-154; D. MCADAM, BLACK INSURGENCY, supra note 33, at 65-145.
38. For useful analyses of segregationist thought and practices, see J. CELL, THE HIGHEST
STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY (1982); J. DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN
(1937); C. JOHNSON, PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION (1943); I. NEWBY, JIM CROW'S DE-
FENSE: ANTI-NEGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1900-1930 (1965).
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A. Segregation in the Public Sphere
Segregation was a way of life determined in large part by whites who
virtually monopolized state power and used that power to subjugate
blacks. Although the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibited
states from disenfranchising persons on account of race, the White South
openly and successfully used private power and state authority to deny the
Negro the ballot.39 On the one hand, terroristic violence and economic
intimidation dissuaded many blacks from exercising their rights to politi-
cal participation.40 On the other hand, literacy tests, poll taxes, permanent
disenfranchisement upon conviction for certain crimes, creation of super-
majoritarian districting schemes, "grandfather clauses," and "white
primaries" provided "legal" means of disenfranchisement.41 By the mid-
1950's, some of these impediments had been invalidated.42 But several of
the most effective obstacles to black participation remained untouched. In
1956, only 25 percent of all black adults in the South were registered to
vote as compared to 65 percent of all white adults.43 Moreover, black vot-
ing was largely confined to urban areas. In many rural areas, black voters
were virtually non-existent; in Mississippi in 1955, fourteen rural coun-
ties with large black populations had no black registered voters.44 Al-
though less oppressive than in Mississippi, the environment in Alabama
for Negro participation in electoral politics was also dismal. In 1960, only
9.1 percent of the voting age blacks in Montgomery County were regis-
tered, in comparison to 46.1 percent of the voting age whites. 5 In two
39. On the history of racial struggle over the ballot-box in the South, see M. EDDS, FREE AT
LAST: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED WHEN CIVIL RIGHTS CAME TO SOUTHERN POLITICS (1987); J.
KoussER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISH-
MENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); S. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING
RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 (1976) [hereinafter BLACK BALLOTS]; S. LAWSON, IN PURSUIT
OF POWER: SOUTHERN BLACKS AND ELECTORAL POLITICS, 1965-1982 (1985) [hereinafter IN PUR-
SUIT OF POWER]; MINORITY VOTE DILUTION (C. Davidson ed. 1984); The Negro Voter in the
South, 27 J. NEGRO EDUC. 213 (1957).
40. See S. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS, supra note 39, at 15, 130-32.
41. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-15 (1966) (cataloguing devices and ploys
used to exclude blacks from participation in southern politics); see also S. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS,
supra note 39, at 1-139.
42. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (declaring unconstitutional rule of private
political association prohibiting black participation in vote to select candidate in major party primary);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (declaring unconstitutional rule of major state political party
excluding black participation in party primary); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (declar-
ing unconstitutional provision exempting descendants of those who voted before enactment of Fifteenth
Amendment from literacy requirements).
43. See J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 134 (1959); D. GARROW, PRO-
TEST AT SELMA, supra note 33, at 11.
44. D. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 33, at 9.
45. See VOTING: 1961 COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 23-27 (1961). Describing what it
was like for a black to try to register, Martin Luther King observed that "[alt the registration office
are separate lines and separate tables for voters according to race. The registrars servicing Negro lines
move at a noticeably leisurely pace, so that of fifty Negroes in line, as few as fifteen may be reached
by the end of the day." M.L. KING, STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY 29
(1958).
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other Alabama counties populated predominantly by blacks, none were
registered.
4 6
The success of white supremacists in negating black political participa-
tion produced all sorts of collateral consequences burdensome to Negroes.
The elimination of Negro voters freed white politicians to ignore or to
attack their black constituents at little or no political cost. At the national
level, white supremacists in Congress stymied federal legislation aimed at
relieving the oppression of the Southern Negro. On scores of occasions
between 1920 and 1950, the Southern bloc in Congress succeeded in kill-
ing federal anti-lynching legislation.4  At the local level, white
supremacists turned every lever of state power into an instrument of racial
oppression. There was little that Negroes could do through conventional
politics to oust officials who hired only whites as agents of the state-e.g.,
prosecutors, tax-assessors, jury commissioners, or police officers. In Mont-
gomery in 1954, the hiring of four blacks to the previously all-white po-
lice force was considered a noteworthy breakthrough. But even such a
minimal change as this triggered extreme white resentment. To placate
enraged whites, the Montgomery Police Chief stated that the new black
policemen were "just niggers doing a nigger's job."48
White officials, reflecting their own personal biases as well as the social
dynamics that placed them in office, exercised discretion in ways that al-
most invariably slighted black interests. What this meant concretely was
that blacks typically received inferior public goods and services. The sepa-
rate and unequal character of segregated public schooling has been well-
publicized. But what has not been adequately appreciated is the all-
inclusive extent of systematic inequity. From sewer service to lighting to
the upkeep of streets to law enforcement to recreational facilities, blacks
could realistically expect to receive fewer resources because of racial
bias.50
Political subordination was facilitated by stigmatizing beliefs regarding
the alleged moral and intellectual inferiority of Negroes.5" One asserted
46. VOTING: 1961 COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 45, at 26-27.
47. See R. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING 1909-1950 (1980); Rable,
The South and the Politics of Antilynching Legislation, 1920-1940, 51 J. S. HIST. 201 (1985).
48. See Thornton, Challenge and Response in the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955-1956, 33
ALA. REV. 163, 175 (1980).
49. See, e.g., R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
50. On municipal services, see Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (en
banc) (per curiam); C. HAAR & D. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS 27-54 (1986). On
recreational facilities, see McKay, Segregation and Public Recreation, 40 VA. L. REV. 697 (1954). In
1952, nine southern states set aside 12 public parks for blacks, 180 for whites. Id. at 704. In Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, and Texas there were no public park facilities available to Negroes, although those
states made available 7,000, 10,972, and 58,126 acres of park land, respectively, for whites to use. Id.
at 703.
51. Instructive expositions of segregationist ideology at mid-century include T. BRADY, BLACK
MONDAY (1955); J. KILPATRICK, THE CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION (1962); H. TALMADGE,
YOU AND SEGREGATION (1955); W. WORKMAN, JR., THE CASE FOR THE SOUTH (1960).
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reason for excluding blacks from activities which ideally required respon-
sibility, honesty, and intelligence was that they simply lacked such traits.
Tremendous effort was expended toward eliminating blacks as jurors, for
instance, not only because their presence might have made a difference in
certain categories of cases-e.g., interracial disputes-but also because it
was simply not "fitting" for blacks to participate in the administration of
justice, because they were incapable of conducting themselves properly.
5 2
B. Segregation in the Private Sphere
Deep-seated contempt also expressed itself in governmental commands
requiring racial separation even in "private" contexts in which individual
whites and blacks might themselves desire to interact. In the mid-1950's,
Southern statute books were full of laws that punished interracial sex
with enhanced penalties53 and that prohibited or rendered void interracial
marriages." The quasi-religious punctiliousness with which local govern-
ments stamped segregation upon the social fabric of their jurisdictions is
vividly illustrated by a city ordinance in Montgomery which declared it
unlawful to conduct a restaurant or any other place for the serving
of food . . . at which white and colored people are served in the
same room, unless such white and colored people are effectually sep-
arated by a solid partition extending from the floor upward to a dis-
tance of seven feet or higher and unless a separate entrance from the
street is provided for each compartment.55
It was virtually inevitable, of course, that state-enforced racial subordi-
nation would condition the racial mores of private parties even in areas
left unregulated by statute. In the job market, for instance, the racial
prejudice of employers and labor unions, along with the consequences of
52. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), reversed by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
sheds considerable light on the exclusion of Negroes from juries in Alabama during the first half of
this century. See also Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (finding that Negroes had been ex-
cluded from jury service solely because of their race despite contrary finding by state court which
relied in part on local newspaper editor who testified he knew of no Negroes in his county who
possessed good judgment required for jury service); G. STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERI-
CAN LAW 247-71 (1910); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235,
268-273 (1968); Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro Defendant and His
Peerless Jury, 4 Hous. L. REV. 448 (1967); Morgan, Segregated Justice, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE,
supra note 32; Tucker, Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection in Virginia, 52 VA. L. REv. 736,
748 (1966); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the
All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REv. 1157 (1966).
53. For a comprehensive list of state statutes, see J. GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 396. It was
not until McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), that the Supreme Court invalidated a state
statutory scheme that provided for a greater possible punishment for interracial cohabitation than
intraracial cohabitation.
54. It was not until Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), that the Supreme Court invalidated
state-imposed prohibitions against interracial marriage.
55. Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 119 n.10 (5th Cir. 1963) (quoting MONTGOMERY, ALA.,
CODE ch. 10 § 14 (1952)).
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historical deprivations, combined to create a system of occupational strati-
fication under which blacks were relegated to the lowest paying and least
prestigious positions.5" In a typical Southern city in the 1950's, at least 75
percent of the black men labored as unskilled workers in contrast to 25
percent of the white men.57 While 50 percent of black working women
labored as domestics, less than one percent of white working women were
so employed.5 8 In Montgomery in 1950, the median income for whites
was $1730, for blacks $970.59 In a city of about 106,000-60 percent
white and 40 percent black-three physicians, one dentist, two lawyers,
and one pharmacist occupied the top of the black occupational hierarchy.
By contrast, the white population boasted 144 physicians and surgeons, 43
dentists, 189 lawyers and judges, and 62 pharmacists. Ministerial service
was the one professional occupation in which the numbers of blacks com-
pared favorably with the number of whites: 92 black clergymen and 95
white.6°
What one analyst wrote in 1967 applied afortiori to the state of affairs
a decade earlier:
In the South, Negro employment opportunity is rigidly prescribed by
traditions in race relations. The practice of dividing the work market
into "white jobs" and "Negro jobs" has been clearly defined, and
practices governing use of the Negro labor force have been reduced
to observable "laws." For example, Negroes seldom work side by
side with whites in the South, particularly in jobs that carry advan-
tages in income, responsibility, potential for upgrading, and cleanli-
ness. This is the case whether on the assembly line or elsewhere in
the plant or business. Negroes rarely, if ever, supervise whites in the
South, and opportunity for them to apply themselves at tasks com-
mensurate with their skills and abilities is overwhelmingly confined
to segregated areas of the economy that provide services to other
Negroes."1
Mrs. Rosa Parks' experience was characteristic.62 Although she was one
of a small number of black high school graduates in Montgomery, she
56. See generally W. HARRIS, THE HARDER WE RUN: BLACK WORKERS SINCE THE CIVIL
WAR (1982); H. NORTHRUP, NEGRO EMPLOYMENT IN BASIC INDUSTRY: A STUDY OF RACIAL
POLICIES IN SIx INDUSTRIES (1970); Norrell, Caste in Steel: Jim Crow Careers in Birmingham,
Alabama, 74 J. AM. Hisr. 669 (1987).
57. A. MORRIS, supra note 33, at 1.
58. Id.
59. M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 27-28.
60. See L. Yeakey, The Montgomery Alabama Bus Boycott, 1955-1956, at 5-10 (1979) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (describing employment situation for black women in Montgomery in 1950).
61. Henderson, Regions, Race and Jobs, in EMPLOYMENT, RACE, AND POVERTY 78 (A. Ross &
H. Hill eds. 1967); see also J. GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 154-207 (describing legal landscape of
antidiscriminination law in employment as of 1959).
62. Rosa Parks' defiance of segregationist etiquette sparked the Montgomery Bus Boycott of
1955-1956. See infra text accompanying notes 108-116.
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found herself unable to obtain employment in which she could put to full
use her educational training and abilities; all she could obtain were menial
jobs. 3
C. The Etiquette Of Segregation
Segregation also conditioned etiquette-the micropolitics of day-to-day
living. The essential function of segregationist racial etiquette was to de-
fine and maintain the social distance necessary to highlight the social su-
periority of whites in relation to blacks."4
Jim Crow etiquette required blacks to address whites as "Mr." or
"Mrs.," but allowed whites to address blacks by their first names.15 It
counselled blacks to enter a white person's dwelling from the rear, but
imposed no reciprocal expectation." It required blacks and whites to dine
separately under all circumstances . 7 And it warned black men to show
absolutely no sexual interest in white women while tolerating white men's
sexual attraction to black women. As one observer commented, "[I]n the
social framework of the southern region there is no place for the discus-
sion of sex relations involving a white woman and a Negro man. Even a
rumor of this kind threatens the security of the Negro."68 Brutally illus-
trating the degree to which the race line in sexual affairs remained dan-
gerously charged in the mid-fifties, particularly in the rural Deep South,
was the killing in August 1955-three months before the advent of the
Montgomery Bus Boycott-of a black youngster in LeFlore County, Mis-
sissippi."9 Raised in Chicago, Illinois, and therefore unfamiliar with the
racial etiquette of southern segregation, fourteen year-old Emmett Till
made the fatal mistake of whistling at a white girl.70 For that infraction,
he was bludgeoned and shot in the head. Still more instructive is that an
all-white jury acquitted those charged with Till's murder even though the
evidence pointed overwhelmingly to their guilt.
7 1
63. See Thornton, supra note 48, at 175; see also L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 12-14.
64. See generally C. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 117-55; R. WRIGHT, The Ethics of Living Jim
Crow, in UNCLE TOM'S CHILDREN (1936).
65. C. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 137-39.
66. Id. at 123-36.
67. Id. at 143-45. Illustrating the strength of the taboo against interracial dining, Johnson re-
counts how a party of white men and their Negro guide solved the problem of maintaining segregated
dining on a small fishing boat. "At noon they all ate; but for the comfort of the party a stick was laid
across the boat between the Negro and the whites, and lunch and conversation took place without
strain." Id. at 143.
68. Id. at 146.
69. See S. WHITFIELD, DEATr IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL (1988).
70. Cf. C. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 272:
The Negroes who live . . .in a particular locality know what can and cannot be done; the
stranger from another city of the South is less certain of details but knows the broad pattern;
the Negro from the North is lost and, unless escorted by a native, is almost certain to get into
trouble.
71. See S. WHITFIELD, supra note 69, at 33-50; see also EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICAS'S CIVIL
RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965, supra note 4, at 37-58.
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D. Segregation's Limits
Although segregation privileged whites at the expense of blacks, it did
not represent a complete victory for white supremacy. Rather, it embodied
an uneasy compromise between the racial egalitarianism that emerged
powerfully during the First Reconstruction and the white supremacist re-
action that followed.7 2 On the one hand, after dismantling the First Re-
construction during the last three decades of the nineteenth century,
whites in the South largely succeeded in disenfranchising blacks. On the
other, the guarantee of the Fifteenth Amendment stood in the way of a
formal color bar in electoral politics. 73 Similarly, white power structures
in southern locales largely succeeded in materially and psychologically
crippling black communities. Yet, the fact that, at least formally, the states
owed blacks services equal to those provided to whites represented a nag-
ging reminder that the Civil War and Reconstruction had successfully im-
posed certain limitations on the use of power by whites.7 4 Although the
White North largely abandoned the Southern Negro to his former masters
after the collapse of Reconstruction, the specter of northern intervention in
southern affairs remained a potent enough deterrent to exercise some de-
gree of restraint over white southern policymakers.7 5
Segregation, moreover, never wholly succeeded in legitimating itself.
Some blacks embraced it.78 But many more recognized segregation as a
form of oppression and, with a few white allies, challenged it whenever
they thought they could reasonably do so without paying too high a cost.
At the turn of the century, for instance, blacks used boycotts to fight the
introduction of segregation to municipal transportation. Between 1900 and
1907, blacks boycotted segregated streetcars in at least twenty-seven cities,
including Montgomery. 7 This precursor to the boycott of 1955-56 lasted
two years-from 1900 to 1902-and compelled a private streetcar com-
pany to disregard, at least temporarily, the City's segregation ordinance.78
The blacks' victory, however, was short-lived; segregationist practice was
soon reimposed. Even the memory of the temporary victory was lost;
72. On Reconstruction's beneficial influence upon the onerously oppressive regime that super-
seded it, see E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
602-03 (1987) ("Reconstruction closed off even more oppressive alternatives than the Redeemer's
New South.").
73. See J. KOUSSER, supra note 39.
74. See H. RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1865-1890 (1978).
75. See, e.g., J. KOUSSER, supra note 39, at 45-46 (fear of federal intervention helped to limit
range of means used to disenfranchise Negroes); Rable, supra note 47 (fear of federal intervention
helped motivate white southern politicians to take action against lynching).
76. See C. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 244-66; N. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL
207-08 (1971) (describing White Citizens Council support for black conservative critics of NAACP).
77. See The Boycott Movement Against Jim Crow Streetcars in the South, 1900-1906, in A.
MEIER & E. RUDWICK, ALONG THE COLOR LINE: EXPLORATIONS IN THE BLACK EXPERIENCE 267
(1976).
78. A similar response occurred during the boycott of 1955-1956. See infra text accompanying
notes 267-89.
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neither Martin Luther King nor any of the other leaders of the later boy-
cott mentioned the earlier struggle."9 Still, the very occurrence of these
twenty-seven turn-of-the-century boycotts vividly indicates the presence of
an active black resistance even during the worst periods of segregationist
repression.
Another manifestation of resistance was litigation aimed at challenging
various features of the segregation regime. This litigation, much of it di-
rected by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), attacked a wide spectrum of practices including racial exclu-
sion in the composition of juries,"0 residential segregation,81 voting dis-
crimination,"2 and segregation in interstate transportation.8" The capstone
of this effort was Brown v. Board of Education,"4 the most famous Su-
preme Court decision of the twentieth century, the case in which the Jus-
tices unanimously held that de jure segregation in public schooling vio-
lated the Constitution.
Viewed collectively, these suits embody the most successful campaign of
social reform litigation in American history. But inasmuch as officials fre-
quently ignored or evaded judicial decisions, one must be careful not to
exaggerate the consequences of victorious lawsuits. Rulings often promised
far more on paper than the legal machinery delivered in the crucible of
day-to-day living. By 1955, however, the cumulative weight of Supreme
Court precedent had combined with other important trends and develop-
ments, such as a general revulsion against racism in the aftermath of the
Holocaust and a felt need to compete with the Soviet Union for the hearts
and minds of people of color in Africa and Asia,85 to shift white public
opinion, putting proponents of segregation squarely on the defensive.88
79. Professors Meier and Rudwick aptly refer to the turn-of-the-century protest as a "forgotten
movement." A. MEIER & E. RUDWICK, supra note 77, at 266.
80. See, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161
(1910).
81. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (prohibiting state court enforcement of privately-
drawn, racially restrictive covenant); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (invalidating statute
prescribing residential discrimination on the basis of race); see generally C. VosE, CAUCASIANS ONLY
(1959).
82. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (invalidating "White Primary"); Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating "Grandfather Clause").
83. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (prohibiting segregated dining
facilities aboard interstate carrier); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (invalidating state segre-
gation statute applied to black interstate traveller); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941)
(invalidating action that discriminated against black interstate traveller by compelling him to ride in
second class although he had purchased first class ticket); see generally C. BARNES, supra note 33.
84. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court had slowly and carefully set the stage for Brown. See, e.g.,
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (state must offer blacks facilities for graduate
education if state offers whites such facilities); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (black student
must be admitted to publicly-funded law school set aside for whites if facility set aside for blacks was
not, in fact, of equal quality).
85. See generally Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61
(1988).
86. Structural changes that played a large, though under-appreciated, role in eroding the segrega-
tion regime included the decline of cotton as the mainstay of the southern economy, the increased
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E. Segregationist Counter-Attacks
Segregationist defensiveness, however, displayed itself aggressively."7
Authorities attempted to eliminate the NAACP by applying some of the
same tactics that states and the national government had previously em-
ployed against left-wing organizations.88 States tried to force local chap-
ters of the NAACP to disclose their membership lists,"9 enacted statutes
that prohibited the NAACP from urging blacks to use its legal staff to
seek redress through litigation, 90 and disseminated derogatory propaganda
urbanization of southern blacks, and the creation through northward migration of strategic blocs of
black voters. See D. MCADAM, BLACK INSURGENCY, supra note 33, at 65-116. Other important
developments that both reflected and encouraged progressive reforms in race relations included Presi-
dent Roosevelt's creation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) that sought to prevent
a threatened march on the nation's capitol protesting racial discrimination, see H. GARFINKEL, WHEN
NEGROES MARCH: THE MARCH ON WASHINGTON MOVEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS
FOR FEPC (1959); publication of Gunnar Myrdal's AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, see D. SOUTHERN,
GUNNER MYRDAL AND BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS: THE USE AND ABUSE OF AN AMERICAN DI-
LEMMA, 1944-1969 (1987); Jackie Robinson's crossing of the color line in organized baseball, see J.
TYGIEL, BASEBALL'S GREAT EXPERIMENT: JACKIE ROBINSON AND His LEGACY (1984); and Presi-
dent Truman's order to desegregate the armed forces, see B. NALTY, STRENGTHEN FOR THE FIGHT:
A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS IN THE MILITARY 235-54 (1986).
87. See generally N. BARTLEY, supra note 37; M. BELKNAP, supra note 20, at 27-52; N. MC-
MLLAN, supra note 76; C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 154-63 (3d
rev. ed. 1974).
88. On the southern states' attacks upon the NAACP and the judicial consequences, see H.
KALVEN, supra note 3, at 65-121; Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74
YALE L.J. 1 (1964); McKay, The Repression of Civil Rights As an Aftermath of the School Segrega-
tion Cases, 4 How. L.J. 9 (1958); Robison, Protection of Associations from Compulsory Disclosure
of Membership, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 614 (1958); Freedom of Association, 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 207
(1959).
89. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (reversing
contempt conviction for refusing to divulge information contained in NAACP membership lists to
state legislative committee investigating infiltration of communists into various organizations); Louisi-
ana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) (affirming injunction prohibiting state from
enforcing law requiring NAACP to file with state lists of its officers and members); Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (reversing conviction of NAACP officials found to have violated
state law requiring production of membership lists); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958) (reversing judgment for contempt of court for refusal to produce membership lists). States
also enacted laws that attempted to force members of the NAACP to identify themselves publicly. See,
e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (invalidating Arkansas statute requiring every public
school teacher to file annual affidavit listing every organization to which he or she has belonged
within preceeding five years); see also Freedom of Association, supra note 88, at 234-35 (describing
statewide registration laws of Arkansas, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia enacted after
the School Segregation Cases).
90. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (invalidating state statute prohibiting solici-
tation of legal business by any person or organization not a party to a case and having no pecuniary
interest in it). For a comprehensive discussion of state action aimed at crippling the NAACP's ability
to litigate cases, see Inciting Litigation, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 1257 (1958).
Apart from governmental intimidation, social pressure generated by white segregationists dissuaded
many attorneys from representing civil rights activists or raising legal issues that challenged racist
practices. See United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 850 (1959) ("As Judges of a Circuit comprising six states of the deep South, we think that it is
our duty to take judicial notice that lawyers residing in many southern jurisdictions rarely, almost to
the point of never, raise the issue of systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries."); Oppenheim, The
Abdication of the Southern Bar, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 127; Note, Negro Defend-
ants and Southern Lawyers: Review in Federal Habeas Corpus of Systematic Exclusion of Negroes
From Juries, 72 YALE L.J. 559 (1963).
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about the organization."1 Moreover, in the wake of Brown, the political
leadership of the Southern states engaged in "massive resistance"92 that
included resolutions by state legislatures declaring the Supreme Court's
judgment "null, void and of no effect," ' laws that imposed sanctions
against anyone who actually implemented desegregation,94 subterfuges
that evaded or drastically slowed desegregation,95 and school closing plans
that authorized the suspension of public education and the disbursement
of public funds to parents and children for use in obtaining education in
"private," segregated facilities.9"
Although at mid-century, politics in the South remained predominantly
"white folk's business," a segregationist reaction was prompted by
NAACP victories in the courts along with an increase in black voter regis-
tration.9" To stem further increases, the Deep South states used two ma-
neuvers in tandem: one tightened registration requirements, while the
91. On May 29, 1956, in House Concurrent Resolution Number Nine, the Louisiana Legislature
provided for the continuation of a joint legislative committee to conduct investigations, make studies,
provide information and draft legislation for the purpose of "carrying on . . . the fight to maintain
segregation of the races .. ." 1 RACE REL. L. REI'. 755 (1956). According to the Race Relations
Law Reporter, this Committee "aired considerable testimony unfavorable to the NAACP. . . ." Free-
dom of Association, supra note 87, at 229. South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi,
and Arkansas also used legislative investigative committees to probe and besmirch the NAACP. Id. at
228-33.
92. Perhaps the best known document promulgated by the congressional arm of the massive resis-
tance movement was The Southern Manifesto, 102 CONG. REc., No. 43, 3948, 4004 (1956), re-
printed in 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 435 (1956) (19 southern Senators and 77 southern members of
House of Representatives pledge "to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of [Brown] . . .
and to prevent the use of force in its implementation"). Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia has been
credited with coining the term "massive resistance." See F. WILHOsT, THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE
RESISTANCE 55 (1973).
93. See 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 437-47 (1956) (resolutions of interposition and nullification passed
by the legislatures of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia); see also McKay,
"With All Deliberate Speed": A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1017-39
(1956); Interposition vs. Judicial Power, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 465 (1956).
94. See 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 450-51 (1956) (describing Georgia statute providing that any state
officer failing to enforce state segregation laws would be subject to discharge and forfeiture of retire-
ment and other benefits).
95. Some jurisdictions employed time-tables that tested the limits of the Supreme Court's order to
proceed with desegregation "with all deliberate speed." See, e.g., Kelly v. Board of Educ., 270 F.2d
209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959) (upholding desegregation of only one grade per
year). Others used vague, discretionary, pupil-placement procedures to stymie desegregation. Others
sought to hinder desegregation by making the transfer of students from one school to another the
subject of long and complicated administrative decisionmaking. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham
Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.), afd, 358 U.S. 101 (1958) (upholding Alabama statute
that purported to guide administrative decisions regarding transfer of pupils based on student's "psy-
chological qualifications" and potential for ill-will that might be generated by given transfer); see
generally Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
193 (1964); Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, in THE WARREN COURT: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS (R. Sayler, B. Boyer & R. Gooding eds. 1969).
96. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (inval-
idating scheme whereby public schools in Prince Edward County were closed while white children
received tuition grants and tax concessions to attend private segregated schools); see generally School
Closing Plans, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 807 (1958).
97. Although 75 to 80 percent of southern Negroes remained unregistered in 1954, the number
who were registered represented a four-fold increase since 1940. See S. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS,
supra note 39, at 129.
1014
King's Constitution
other augmented the discretion of local registrars. Tightening registration
requirements enabled states to exclude a disproportionate number of
blacks by even-handed application of. race-silent criteria. Augmenting the
discretion of registrars enabled states to (1) cheat on behalf of whites who
would otherwise have been excluded by the elevated criteria and (2) ex-
clude blacks who, if fairly evaluated, could satisfy the new standards.9"
In some areas, officials did more than slow or stop black progress; they
rolled it back. In Louisiana, for instance, parish registrars were en-
couraged by a legislative committee to search the registration applications
of Negroes for errors that could be used as the basis for revoking registra-
tion. Applying this method, registrars removed ten to eleven thousand
blacks from voting rolls in twelve parishes between 1956 and 1957.99
Accompanying the reaction of state governments were responses by pri-
vate persons and organizations. A new group, the White Citizen's Coun-
cil,100 engaged in a campaign to "persuade" blacks who had registered to
strike their names "voluntarily" from the voting roles. In Sunflower
County, Mississippi, the Council's efforts caused black registration to fall
from 114 to zero within a matter of months.10 1
Economic coercion played an important role in dissuading blacks from
voting or exercising other rights purportedly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.10 2 Also influential was the willingness and ability of whites to resort
to violence in defense of the old order. Between 1955 and 1959, 210 inci-
dents of racial violence were recorded in the eleven states of the Old Con-
federacy. 0 ' This catalogue of terror included six murders, twenty-nine
assaults with firearms, forty-four beatings, and sixty bombings.10 4 To put
the matter more concretely it involved
98. See id. at 86-139; see also United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala.), aff d,
304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), affd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962) (finding that on basis of race registrars delayed
processing black registrants, offered special assistance to whites, graded blacks more stringently, failed
to mail registration certificates to blacks, and failed to notify rejected black applicants); Davis v.
Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), affd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (invalidating Boswell Amendment
providing that only persons who could "understand and explain" any article of the Constitution to
reasonable satisfaction of Board of Registrars may qualify to vote); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F.
Supp. 353 (1963), aff d, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (same).
99. See D. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 33, at 9-10; Fenton, The Negro Voter in
Louisiana, 26 J. NEGRO EDuC. 319 (1957); Vines, A Louisiana Perish: Wholesale Purge, in M.
PRICE, THE NEGRO AND THE BALLOT IN THE SOUTH (1959).
100. The Council movement was born in 1954 in Mississippi as a direct off-shoot of white resis-
tance to Brown v. Board of Education. It spread throughout the South but was most popular and
effective in the deep South. Like the Ku Klux Klan, the Council movement was a decentralized
federation of local organizations that differed in style and substance. Unlike the Klan, the Council
conducted its operations publicly and sought and received support from middle-class, "respectable"
white southerners. See generally N. MCMILLFN, supra note 76.
101. See D. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 33, at 9.
102. See N. MCMILLAN, supra note 76, at 216 (describing economic coercion in Humphrey's
County, Mississippi); M. PRICE, supra note 99, at 20-21, 42; Lewis, The Negro Voter in Mississippi,
26 J. NEGRO EDuc. 343 (1957).
103. See M. BELKNAP, supra note 20, at 29.
104. Id.
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a raid by more than a hundred sheeted men into the black section of
Maplesville, Alabama, that left six Negroes injured . . . the castra-
tion of a Negro handyman in Birmingham, Alabama, as part of a
Klan ceremony . . . the flogging of a white school teacher in Cam-
den, South Carolina, because he had allegedly made a favorable ref-
erence to desegregation . . . the shotgun displayed by a robed
Klansman as a motorcade of some one hundred cars drove through a
Negro residential section in Summerville, Georgia . . . the dynamit-
ing of a white physician's home in Gaffney, South Carolina, because
the physician's wife had written an article favoring racial justice...
the Negro woman who withdrew her suit against a North Carolina
school board after receiving threats that her children would never
return if they attended the white school . . . [and] the flogging of a
white sawmill worker in Stanton, Alabama, because he was accused
of 'associating too freely with Negroes.'1 5
Such was the state of affairs in the South at mid-century.
II. REBELLION IN MONTGOMERY
No events better epitomized the struggle of Southern blacks against seg-
regation during the Second Reconstruction than the boycotts directed
against Jim Crow seating on buses, "one of the few places . . . where
blacks and whites were segregated under the same roof and in full view of




The spark that ignited the boycott was the refusal of a black wo-
man-Rosa Parks' 08-to follow a driver's directive that she relinquish her
105. N. BARTLEY, supra note 37, at 208 (footnotes ommitted).
106. A. MORRIS, supra note 33, at 17.
107. The first of these boycotts erupted in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In March 1953, blacks suc-
cessfully petitioned the City Council of Baton Rouge to pass an ordinance that rescinded the old
system in which Negroes were prohibited from ever sitting in seats reserved for whites, even if those
seats were empty. Under the old system, "every public bus had a 'colored section' section in the back
and a 'white section' in the front. If the white section filled up, blacks had to move farther toward the
back, carrying with them the sign designating 'colored.' When blacks filled up the colored section,
however, they had to stand even though seats in the white section were vacant." Id. at 17. That
ordinance, however, never became effective. First, the state Attorney General concluded that the
ordinace conflicted with Louisiana's segregation laws. Second, the bus drivers, all of whom were
white, insisted that blacks continue to sit in the back of buses. The black community responded by
boycotting the buses. Its consumer strike lasted a week, was joined by about 90 percent of the black
bus-riding public, and imposed heavy financial losses on the bus company. The boycott came to an
end with a compromise: small sections of the bus at the front and the rear were reserved on a racial
basis while the remainder of the seats were allocated on a basis of first-come-first-served. Id. at 17-25.
108. The particular victim of the arrest mattered to the evolution of the events that followed. Rosa
Parks had long been active in civil rights activity and was known, respected, and liked by many
within the black community. King used her standing within the community as further evidence of the
intolerable nature of existing practices. "Just the other day," he reminded the congregation that rati-
fied the call for a general boycott of the buses, "one of the finest citizens in Montgomery-not one of
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seat and move further back into the rear, "black" section of the bus.'0 9
The seat she occupied was located in the first row of the black section, a
row filled by three blacks besides Mrs. Parks. According to one version of
the facts, the bus driver demanded that Mrs. Parks and the other blacks
on her row vacate their seats to accomodate several white passengers. In
this account, a sense of segregationist equity informed the driver's deci-
sion. On this predominantly black route, the bus company allocated ten
seats to the whites and twenty-six to the blacks. But on this particular
run, the driver "undertook to readjust the seating to a more equitable
ratio . . . by altering the racial division to fourteen white [seats] and
twenty-two black."" A slightly different version of the facts suggests that
the finest Negro citizens but one of the finest citizens in Montgomery-was taken from a bus and
carried to jail and arrested because she refused to get up to give her seat to a white person. . . . Mrs.
Rosa Parks is a fine person. And since it had to happen, I'm happy it happened to a person like Mrs.
Parks, for nobody can doubt the boundless outreach of her integrity. Nobody can doubt the height of
her character, nobody can doubt the depth of her Christian commitment ....
See King Speech, supra note 4, at 44; see also Brown, Finding Rosa Parks, in READY FROM
WITHIN: SEPTIMA CLARK AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1986); H. RAINES, MY SOUL IS
RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH REMEMBERED 34 (1977) (quoting E.D. Nixon as
saying that "[ijf there ever was a person that we woulda been able to break the situation that existed
S.. Rosa L. Parks was the woman to use"); J. ROBINSON, THE MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT AND
THE WOMEN WHO STARTED IT 43 (1987) (Mrs. Parks "was respected in all black circles"); Green-
field, Rosa Parks, 3 Ms. 71 (Aug. 1974).
109. Reportorial, autobiographical and scholarly accounts that I have found particularly useful
include C. BARNES, supra note 33, at 108-31; T. BRANCH, supra note 33, at 143-205; D. GARROW,
supra note 23, at 11-82; M.L. KING, supra note 44; J. ROBINSON, supra note 109; H. SimroFF,
supra note 32, at 41-68, Gardner, Montgomery Bus Boycott Interviews, 9 S. EXPOSURE 13 (Spring
1981); Nixon, How It All Started, 1 LIBERATION 10 (1956); Reddick, The Bus Boycott in Montgom-
ery, 3 DISSENr 107 (1956); Thornton, supra note 48; L. Yeakey, supra note 60.
110. Thornton, supra note 48, at 194-95. Professor Thornton's rendition of the facts receives
some support from the agreed stipulation of facts that later served as the predicate for Mrs. Parks'
trial in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. See Transcript, at 8, 16, Parks v. Mont-
gomery (No. 4559) (1956) (hereinafter Parks Transcript):
The defendant was sitting on one of the first dual seats immediately behind those occupied by
white passengers and all seats assigned to whites were occupied and all standing room in that
section was taken. Negroes were also standing in the negro section. The evidence is in dispute
as to whether or not there were vacant seats in the negro section. In order to take on more
white passengers who were at that time waiting to board the bus the driver, the agent in
charge, requested the passengers on the row of seats immediately in the rear of the white
section to give up their seats to white passengers. This would have made four more seats
available to whites and under such reassignment the white section would have been increased
to fourteen seats and the negro section decreased to twenty-two seats. The defendant, a negro,
refused to move in accordance with the request of the bus driver, the agent in charge, and was
arrested for such refusal.
Considerable ambiguity surrounded actual seating policy of the company. In Rosa Parks' trial, the
parties stipulated that the bus she was on was divided into simply two sections, one white, one black.
Later, however, during Martin Luther King's trial for organizing the boycott of the buses, see infra
text accompanying notes 184-266, the manager of the bus company testified that on predominantly
black routes, the buses were divided into three sections: a section reserved for whites at the front of the
bus, a section reserved for blacks at the back of the bus, and an undesignated middle-section that was
allocated on a first-come, first-served basis. See Transcript at 241-42, State v. King, No. 7399 (Ala.
Ct. App. 1956) (hereinafter King Transcript]. In actuality, the drivers appear to have allocated seats
in the middle section on an ad hoc basis, which meant typically that blacks were allowed to sit in
those seats only when whites had no use for them. Id. at 244-45; see also L. Yeakey, supra note 60,
at 204-05 ("in Montgomery there was a clear cut inviolable rule consistently and uniformly applied
to both blacks and whites").
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the driver demanded that all of the blacks in Mrs. Parks' row vacate their
seats in order to accomodate only one white passenger. According to this
version, the driver's demand stemmed from an unwritten rule of Jim
Crow etiquette which prohibited blacks and whites from occupying seats
on the same row at the same time."'
Whatever version accords with the reality of the driver's conduct and
motivation, there is no disagreement about the nature of Mrs. Parks' re-
sponse. While the three blacks on either side of her relinquished their
seats as ordered, she stayed put. "I felt it was just something I had to do,"
she later recalled.112 Her refusal to move, however, was more than a per-
sonal whim.1 ' As Martin Luther King observed, she had been "tracked
down by the Zeitgeist.""' "She was anchored to that seat by the accumu-
lated indignities of days gone by and the boundless aspirations of genera-
tions yet unborn." 1 5 When police officers boarded the bus and demanded
that she move, she again refused. "Why do you push us around," she
asked. "I don't know," one of the officers replied, "[b]ut the law is the
law, and you are under arrest."11"
Mrs. Parks' arrest elevated to new levels widespread dissatisfaction
within Montgomery's black community. By the early 1950's, segregation
on the buses had become a flashpoint of frustration and anger. 1 In 1952,
a black man was shot and killed by the Montgomery policy in an alterca-
tion over bus fare. 18 In 1953, in a similar dispute, a white driver beat a
black woman. 1 The source of deepest resentment, however, was not epi-
sodic outrages but rather the ordinary degradations of Jim Crow prac-
tice-standing up over empty seats reserved for whites only, confronting
drivers who refused to make change for Negroes, entering buses from the
rear after paying fares at the front, encountering abuse for forgetting even
111. See D. GARROW, supra note, at 11 ("Montgomery's customary practice of racial preference
demanded that all four blacks would have to stand in order to allow one white man to sit, since no
black was allowed to sit parallel with a white."); L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 251; J. ROBINSON,
supra note 108, at 43; M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 43; cf. G. STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS
IN AMERICAN LAW 230 (1910) (describing North Carolina statute prohibiting blacks and whites from
sitting on same bench and Virginia law barring blacks and whites from sitting side by side unless all
other seats were taken).
112. Quoted in H. SITKOFF, supra note 33, at 42.
113. Although Mrs. Parks did not plan on this particular evening to stage a protest, it is not quite
accurate to term her refusal to move as spontaneous. As she later stated, "I had almost a life history of
being rebellious against being mistreated because of my color." or." Quoted in H. RAINES, supra note
108, at 35. She had long been active in the local chapter of the NAACP and had attended, just a few
months before her arrest, the Highlander Folk School, a remarkable institution in Tennessee that
trained scores of union organizers and civil rights activists. Id.; see also J. GLEN, HIGHLANDER: No
ORDINARY SCHOOL, 1932-1962 136-37 (1988); Brown, supra note 108.
114. M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 44.
115. Id.
116. Quoted in D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 12.
117. A decade before Mrs. Parks' arrest, Gunnar Myrdal observed that Jim Crow travel was
"resented more bitterly . . . than most other forms of segregation." G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA 635 (1944); see generally C. BARNES, supra note 33.
118. J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 21-22.
119. Id. at 22.
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momentarily the code of the color bar. 2 ' Jo Ann Gibson Robinson recal-
led with seering vividness the pain she suffered at the hands of a driver
who assailed her for sitting (mistakenly) in a seat reserved for whites:
I leaped to my feet, afraid he would hit me, and ran to the front
door to get off the bus. . . . Tears blinded my vision; waves of hu-
miliation inundated me; and I thanked God that none of my students
was on that bus. . . . I could have died from embarrassment ...
In all these years I have never forgotten the shame, the hurt, of that
experience. The memory will not go away. 2
B. The WPC's Modest Proposals
In the early 1950's, a black women's civic organization-the Women's
Political Council (WPC)-took the lead in seeking to secure better treat-
ment for blacks from the bus company. 22 The WPC requested and ob-
tained meetings with city and bus company officials to convey complaints
and requests. It simply asked for "fairness" within the bounds of segrega-
tion. On May 21, 1954-four days after the announcement of Brown v.
Board of Education-the WPC requested not an end to the enforcement
of segregation laws but merely the cessation of certain practices that were
not compelled by statute: ousting blacks from seats outside the reserved
"white sections" of buses and requiring blacks to enter buses through the
rear after paying in the front. 2 Despite the modesty of the WPC's re-
quests, it received little satisfaction. The WPC informed city officials that
a boycott was in the offing unless something was done to better the situa-
tion. 2 Yet in March and October 1955, two black teenagers were ar-
rested for refusing to relinquish their seats. 25 Then came the arrest of
Rosa Parks.
The WPC took the lead in initiating a boycott by blanketing black
120. See id. at 34-36.
121. Id. at 16; cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (state enforced segregation
in public schools generates feelings of inferiority that may affect "students' hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone").
122. Founded in 1946, the WPC consisted of a group of civic-minded black women who initially
addressed themselves to developing educational projects, fighting juvenile delinquency, and encourag-
ing Negro voter registration. On the origins and activities of the WPC, see A. MORRIS, supra note
33, at 53; L. Yeakey, supra note 60; J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 22-30.
123. See J. ROBINSON, supra note 109, at viii.
124. In its letter of May 21, 1954, the WPC told Mayor Gayle:
[Tjhree-fourths of the riders of [the buses] are Negroes. If Negroes did not patronize them,
they could not possibly operate.
More and more of our people are already arranging with neighbors and friends to ride to
keep from being insulted and humiliated by bus drivers.
There has been talk from twenty-five or more local organizations of planning a city-wide
boycott of busses.
Id.
125. See id. at 37-38.
1989] 1019
The Yale Law Journal
neighborhoods with leaflets that urged Negroes to forego riding the buses
on the day of Mrs. Parks' trial:
Another Negro woman has been arrested and thrown in jail because
she refused to get up out of her seat on the bus for a white person to
sit down. . . . If we do not do something to stop these arrests, they
will continue. The next time it may be you, or your daughter, or
mother. . . . We are, therefore, asking every Negro to stay off the
buses Monday in protest of the arrest and trial. Don't ride the buses
to work, to town, to school, or anywhere. . . . You can . . . afford
to stay out of town for one day. If you work, take a cab, or walk.
But please, children and grown-ups, don't ride the bus . .. .2
The call for a one-day boycott elicited a dramatic response: on Decem-
ber 5, 1955, the vast majority of the black bus-riding public-seventy per-
cent of the bus company's clientele" 2 -refrained from using the buses.
Emboldened by success, leading figures in the black community created a
new umbrella organization-the Montgomery Improvement Association
(MIA)-to coordinate the protest and press for its continuation. "2 ' The
key figure in this process was E.D. Nixon, the local elder statesman of
civil rights activists. Nixon was a Pullman porter who had long been ac-
tive in the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the first black union to
wrest a collective bargaining agreement from a major company, and a
leader of local and state chapters of the NAACP. 29 He marshalled the
support of churchmen and other influential blacks, used his contacts with
the local white press to publicize what was happening, and provided the
protest in its earliest phase with the prestige of his own reputation.
13 0
C. King's Role
Although Nixon was the best-known of the dissidents who founded the
MIA, King was selected to preside over it. He was younger, better edu-
cated, more articulate, and a member of the clergy-a position that gave
him a strong institutional base of support. King was also relatively un-
scarred by one of the features of black life in Montgomery that had long
126. Quoted in id. at 45-46.
127. See L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 188-89.
128. On the origins of the MIA, see D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 16-25; M.L. KING, supra
note 45, at 55-58; Nixon, supra note 109; L. Yeakey, supra note 60.
129. In her memoir, Jo Ann Gibson Robinson describes Nixon's status in Montgomery at the
time of the boycott:
Mr. Nixon was a vital force to be reckoned with. . . . Although he lacked formal training,
[he] was acquainted with most of the members of the police and sheriff's departments, with the
judges and jailers, and with people at city hall ...
When violations of human rights occurred, the victims involved would telephone Mr. Nixon,
and he would go to their rescue.
J. ROBINSON, supra note 109, at 28.
130. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 12-22; H. RAI Es, supra note 108, at 27-30; L.
Yeakey, supra note 60.
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stifled effective responses to racial oppression: bitter personal jealousies
and animosities. He had not resided in Montgomery long enough to be
identified strongly with any given faction or to rub many people the
wrong way. He was the consensus choice of Montgomery's black dissident
elite and quickly gained the support of the city's black masses as well.
King was born and raised in Atlanta, Georgia, in a solidly middle-class
family that wielded considerable influence due to its heritage of leading
churchmen; King's father and maternal grandfather were well-known
pastors. He was educated at Morehouse College, Crozer Theological Sem-
inary, and Boston University, where he earned his doctorate. At the time
of Rosa Parks' arrest, King was engaged in his first pastorship as the
minister of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church. He had resided in Mont-
gomery for only a little more than a year and was only twenty-six years
old.1
31
King's selection as president of the MIA was quickly vindicated by the
speech he delivered the night of Mrs. Parks' trial. Before an overflow
audience at the Holt Street Baptist Church, he delivered, largely extempo-
raneously, a short but impassioned address that sounded many of the ma-
jor themes upon which he would elaborate during the remainder of his
life. He did so with the mix of patriotism and outrage, simplicity and
sophistication that make his speeches among the most memorable in
American history.13 2 "My friends," he began:
we are here this evening for serious business. We are here in a gen-
eral sense because first and foremost, we are American citizens, and
we are determined to acquire our citizenship to the fullness of its
meaning. We are here because of our deep-seated belief that democ-
racy transformed from thin paper to thick action is the greatest form
of government on earth. But we are here in a specific sense because
of the bus situation in Montgomery. We are here because we are
determined to get the situation corrected.'
33
King's speech aroused a tremendous swell of enthusiasm. It expressed sen-
131. King was not a complete unknown. From the beginning of his stay in Montgomery, King
had shown a strong interest in community affairs; a few months before Mrs. Parks' arrest, he had
been offered (but declined) the position of president of the local chapter of the NAACP. Still, King
was less well-known than other, more senior figures such as Nixon or Reverend Ralph Abernathy,
the person who suggested the name of the MIA and who became King's closest friend.
There exists a large biographical literature on King. The most incisive and extensive single work to
appear thus far and the starting point for further investigation is David Garrow's BEARING THE
CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE,
supra note 23; see also L. BENNETT, JR., WHAT MANNER OF MAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. (3d ed. 1968); T. BRANCH, supra note 33; D. LEWIS, KING: A CRITICAL BIOG-
RAPHY (1970); L. REDDICK, CRUSADER WITHOUT VIOLENCE: A BIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. (1959).
132. King recalled later that he had only about twenty minutes beforehand to think about his
remarks. M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 59.
133. King Speech, supra note 4, at 44.
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timents that had long lain dormant: "[T]here comes a time when people
get tired of being trampled over by the iron feet of oppression."'" 4 It ar-
ticulated an urgent yearning for dignity: "We are here to save ourselves
from the patience which makes us patient with less than freedom and
justice."1 5 It stressed the moral and legal righteousness of the protest.
"My friends," King declared:
don't let anybody make us feel that we ought to be compared in our
actions with the Ku Klux Klan or the White Citizens Councils.
There will be no crosses burned at any bus stops in Montgomery.
There will be no white persons pulled out of their homes and taken
out to some distant road and murdered. There will be nobody among
us who will stand up and defy the Constitution of this nation.3 6
The boycott lasted 382 days, from December 5, 1955, to December 21,
1956,37 far longer than its organizers initially thought possible.'38 As
King later observed:
Many of the Negroes who joined the protest did not expect it to
succeed. When asked why, they usually gave three answers: "I didn't
expect Negroes to stick to it," or, "I never thought we Negroes had
the nerve," or, "I thought the pressure from the white folks would
kill it before it got started."13 9
But to the surprise of many, the boycott was consistently effective.
Upwards of ninety percent of the black, bus-riding population-some
40,000 Negroes-honored the plea to stay off the buses.' 40 To transport
the boycotters, the MIA created an alternative transportation network
connected by about eighty to ninety dispatch and pick-up stations all over
Montgomery.' Initially, this alternative system of transportation de-
pended almost wholly on labor and automobiles donated to the MIA on a
part-time basis. But soon the system took on an air of semi-permanence as
the MIA hired drivers, bought vehicles, and forged a remarkably effective
transportation service that operated, according to the White Citizens
Council, with "military precision."1 2
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 45.
137. For a useful chronology of the boycott and events surrounding it, see J. ROBINSON, supra
note 108, at 185-86.
138. According to Reverend Ralph Abernathy, none of the boycott's leaders initially believed that
it could last for more than four days. See Thornton, supra note 48, at 197-98 n.37.
139. See King, Our Struggle, I LIBERATION 3 (1958), reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE:
THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 76 (J. Washington ed. 1986).
140. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 52; M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 53-54; A. LEWIS,
PORTRAIT OF A DECADE 61 (1964); F. SCHULKE & P. MCPHEE, KING REMEMBERED 41 (1986).
141. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 27; J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 91-92.
142. Quoted in A. LEWIS, supra note 140, at 63.
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The success of the MIA's transportation system reflected the extraordi-
nary sense of political commitment that suffused and mobilized the black
community.14 Black Montgomery psychologically declared its indepen-
dence from the white power structure and became, in important respects,
self-governing. King and the other key figures in the MIA provided direc-
tion. But the boycott movement was, throughout its existence, a strikingly
democratic phenomenon. As one friendly observer commented, "If there
was ever an indigenous mass movement, this was it."144 To keep the com-
munity abreast of developments, the MIA published a newsletter. And to
ensure an ongoing and active rapport between leaders and led, the MIA
sponsored weekly mass meetings that rotated from church to church. The
meetings, King later explained:
cut across class lines. The vast majority present were working peo-
ple; yet there was always an appreciable number of professionals in
the audience. Physicians, teachers, and lawyers sat or stood beside
domestic workers and unskilled laborers. The Ph.D's and the no
"D's" were bound together in a common venture. The so-called "big
Negroes" who owned cars and had never ridden the buses came to
know the maids and the laborers who rode the buses every day. Men
and women who had been separated from each other by false stan-
dards of class were now singing and praying together in a common
struggle .... 145
For those who seek in the American past glimpses of communities in
which self-determination constituted a liberating passion rather than a
distasteful chore, black Montgomery in 1955-1956 is a fine example.
That community was probably never more free than during the boycott.
So high was the level of engagement, so deep was the urge to reform, "so
profoundly had the spirit of the protest become a part of the people's lives
that sometimes they even preferred to walk when a ride was available.
The act of walking, for many, had become of symbolic importance. "146
King's greatest contribution to the boycott movement lay in his ability
to conceptualize and articulate a morally attractive vision of the protest.
Two aspects of that vision were particularly influential. One had to do
with his attentiveness to the morality of process. Arguing in Gandhi-like
fashion that the means are the ends in the making, King emphasized in
countless interviews, speeches, and articles the nonviolent, unembitterred,
redemptive character of the protest. "The Negro must work passionately
and unrelentingly for full stature as a citizen," King maintained, "[b]ut he
143. On the social psychology of the boycott, see Valien, The Montgomery Bus Protest as a Social
Movement, in RACE RELATIONS: PROBLEMS AND THEORY 112 (1961).
144. L. REDDICK, supra note 131, at 113.
145. M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 86.
146. Id. at 77-78.
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must not use inferior methods to gain it. He must never come to terms
with falsehood, malice, hate, or destruction.;
147
The second feature of King's contribution had to do with placing the
protest in a framework that enlarged its meaning, that transformed it
from a parochial to a universal struggle. It is true that he made frequent
appeals to racial pride over the course of the boycott, challenging his black
constituency to strike a blow for the betterment of the Negro's fortunes. 48
But he also emphatically portrayed the boycott as a more ambitious and
inclusive undertaking. "We are not struggling merely for the rights of
Negroes," he declared one evening at a MIA prayer meeting." 9 "We are
determined to make America a better place for all people.
1 50
D. The Radicalizing of King and the MIA
The Montgomery story might have turned out far differently had the
Montgomery City Lines been served by a different legal advisor. During
the first few weeks of the boycott, at meetings sponsored by the Alabama
Council on Human Relations (ACHR), the MIA attempted to negotiate a
settlement on the basis of reforms that avoided directly challenging the
legitimacy of de jure segregation."' But the Company's attorney, Jack
Crenshaw, successfully thwarted all attempts to compromise.1 52 Although
he assured the MIA that, of course, the Company would discipline dis-
courteous employees brought to its attention, he was unwilling to concede
147. See id. at 214; see also King, Walk for Freedom, 22 FELLOWSHIP 5, 6 (May 1956), re-
printed in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 138, at 82:
[Tihis is a movement of passive resistance, and the great instrument is the instrument of love.
We feel that this is our chief weapon, and that no matter how long we are involved in the
protest, no matter how tragic the experiences are, no matter what sacrifices we have to make,
we will not let anybody drag us so low as to hate them.
148. See King Speech, supra note 4, at 46:
[Als we prepare ourselves for what lies ahead, let us go out with a grim and bold determina-
tion that we are going to stick together. . . .[So that] [rnight here in Montgomery when the
history books are written in the future, somebody will have to say, 'There lived a race of
people, black people, fleecy locks and black complexion ...who had the moral courage to
stand up for their rights.
See also King, supra note 139, at 76 ("We Negroes have replaced self-pity with self-respect and self-
depreciation with dignity.").
149. See B. RUSTIN, Montgomery Diary, in DOWN THE LINE: THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF
BAYARD RUSTIN 57 (1971).
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. See J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 80 ("Dr. King pointed out that the Negro delegation
was interested in obtaining not changes in present segregation laws, but greater justice and better
treatment for black people on the buses."). In April 1956, six months into the boycott and two months
after filing suit challenging the constitutionality of segregation on the buses, King wrote: "The basic
question of segregation in intrastate travel is already before the courts. Meanwhile we ask only for
what in ...most other cities of the South is considered the southern pattern. We seek the right,
under segregation, from the rear forward on a first-come, first served basis." King, supra note 139, at
76.
152. See M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 111. According to Professor Thornton, Crenshaw's rigid-
ity characterized the disposition of all the white attorneys. "From the outset," Thornton maintains,
"the most inflexible of the whites were the lawyers. . . . [Tihey repeatedly displayed an absolutist
predisposition that precluded compromises." Thornton, supra note 48, at 225-26.
1024
King's Constitution
that there even existed a problem with drivers' demeanor toward black
passengers.15 3 He reported that the Company did not anticipate hiring
any black bus drivers.'" Most importantly, in terms of the evolution of
the protest, he insisted from the outset that the MIA's proposals regarding
altered seating arrangements contradicted state and municipal segregation
statutes.155 According to Crenshaw, "[i]f [the blacks] don't like the law we
have to operate under, . . . they should try to get the law changed, not
engage in an attack on our company."' 56
Crenshaw's argument powerfully strengthened the position of hard-line
segregationists. At least one of the city commissioners appears to have fa-
vored compromising on the basis of the MIA's initial demands on seat-
ing.157 But Crenshaw assailed compromise on the basis of both policy and
legality. Compromise was unwise, he contended, because it would only
feed black defiance. "If we granted the Negroes these demands," he
warned, "they would go about boasting of a victory they had won over the
white people."' 58 Compromise was illegal, he insisted, because the city
ordinance as written could simply not accommodate the reformed seating
arrangement the MIA proposed. 59
The Code of Alabama provided that all transportation companies carry-
ing passengers for hire "shall at all times provide equal but separate ac-
commodations on each vehicle for the white and colored races."' 60 The
Code further declared that the agent in charge of any vehicle "is author-
ized and required to assign each passenger to the division of the vehicle
designated for the race to which the passenger belongs."'' The City of
Montgomery's Code articulated essentially the same rule: "[A] bus line in
the city shall provide equal but separate accommodations for white people
and negroes . . . by requiring [employees to assign passenger seats] . . .
in such manner as to separate the white people from the negroes."'8 2
Nothing in the language of either of these provisions expressly precluded
a system, in which, on a first-come, first-served basis, whites occupied
seats from front to back and Negroes from back to front until all seats
153. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 25; M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 112; J. ROBINSON,
supra note 108, at 81.
154. See M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 112 (quoting Crenshaw as stating "we have no intention
now or in the forseeable future of hiring 'niggras' [sic]"); see also D. GARROW, supra note 23, at
25-26; J. ROBINSON, supra note 109, at 81. Later, an official of the bus company claimed that the
reason there were no black drivers was that no black applicants had applied for a position. See King
Transcript, supra note 111.
155. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 25, 29; M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 111-12; J.
ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 78-81.
156. Quoted in Thornton, supra note 48, at 201.
157. Id. at 202-03.
158. Quoted in M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 112.
159. See Thornton, supra note 48, at 201-03.
160. See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 710 n.1 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (quoting ALA. CODE tit.
48 § 301(31a) (1940), as amended), affd, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 710-11 n.2 (quoting MONTGOMERY, ALA., CODE ch. 6 § 6 (1952)).
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were taken. Moreover, a seating plan of precisely this sort was already in
effect in other segregated southern transportation systems including, most
notably, Mobile, Alabama."0 3
Segregationists in Montgomery objected to this plan, however, on the
grounds that it made no provision for what was to be done if a bus filled
with Negroes who then departed at various times were left with only a
scattered and mixed array of seats available for incoming white passen-
gers. 1 4 The MIA countered this objection by saying that if its plan were
put into effect, Negroes would voluntarily move to vacant seats in the rear
of the bus, while whites would move to vacant seats in the front. The
MIA insisted that "[a]t no time, on the basis of its proposal, will both
races occupy the same seat."'6 5 Its assurances, however, were deemed in-
adequate. Crenshaw's reading of the relevant statutes frustrated the
MIA's impulse to stop short of attacking the state's enforcement of racial
separation per se. "We are not asking an end to segregation," King re-
peatedly stated early in the boycott. "That's a matter for the Legislature
and the courts. We feel that we have a plan within the law."' 6 By block-
ing compromise, Crenshaw helped to radicalize King and the MIA.167
The attack on the boycott was supported by other hardliners. These
were people wholly committed to an unstinting defense of the old order.
In their eyes, more was at stake in Montgomery than money or conve-
nience. "What they are after," Mayor Gayle declared in reference to King
and the MIA, "is the destruction of our social fabric."' 68 Acting on that
belief, the commissioners ended negotiations and instead imposed a "get
tough" policy aimed at crushing the protest. Gayle vowed that the City
Commission was "not going to be part of any program that will get Ne-
groes to ride buses again at the destruction of our heritage and way of
life. "169
City officials sought to break the boycott in three ways. First, they
urged the white community to take a unified and aggressive stance toward
the boycotters. Only a miniscule number of whites in Montgomery pub-
licly supported the MIA.'70 Those who did are noteworthy precisely be-
163. In Mobile, the city code expressly required the sort of segregated seating the MIA proposed.
See Thornton, supra note 48, at 204. I have been unable thus far to determine how the seating
arrangement in Mobile worked in practice.
164. See T. BRANCH, supra note 33, at 150.
165. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 31.
166. Quoted in Thornton, supra note 48, at 201; see also D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 59
(quoting paid advertisement by MIA in January 1956 stating that "[alt no time have we ... directed
our aim at the segregation laws").
167. Commenting later on the failure to reach a compromise, King observed: "Even when we
asked for justice within the segregation laws, the 'powers that be' were not willing to grant it. Justice
and equality, I saw, would never come while segregation remained, because the basic purpose of
segregation was to perpetuate injustice and inequality." M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 113.
168. Quoted in D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 55.
169. Quoted in J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 121.
170. Jo Ann Gibson Robinson exaggerates when she writes that "many whites ... wholeheart-
1026 [Vol. 98: 999
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cause of their peculiarity: they were isolated, ostracized rebels.17 ' Both of
Montgomery's white-owned newspapers attacked the MIA editorially. No
predominantly white organization in the city associated itself with the
boycott. The white ministerial association in the city refused even to meet
with King.172 At the same time, perhaps because they expected the boycott
to fold quickly, white supremacists at both the leadership and grass-roots
levels initially found it difficult to take the boycott seriously enough to be
genuinely alarmed. Upon realizing, however, that they confronted a pro-
test movement that would not easily be subdued, white leaders increas-
ingly began to mobilize the white population. Mayor Gayle, for instance,
urged white employers to stop chauffering their boycotting employees and
to avoid paying them "'blackmail money' in extra weekly transportation
fares."'1 7 3 More importantly, he and the other commissioners joined the
Montgomery affiliate of the White Citizens' Council,'74 an action that
both reflected and accelerated its rapidly rising popularity.17 5 On Febru-
ary 10, 1956, at a Council rally featuring Senator James 0. Eastland of
Mississippi, twelve thousand whites filled the state coliseum in Montgom-
ery in what was then one of the largest political gatherings in the history
of the state.'1
7
No officials publicly encouraged private white violence against the
boycotters, and when violence occurred, they quickly condemned it. On
the other hand, a foreseeable consequence of the commissioners' "get
tough" policy was to unleash certain well-developed violent impulses.
edly supported the boycott." Id. at 101. Her own account casts strong doubt upon that assertion. See
id. at 101-10; see also OUTSME THE MAGIC CIRCLE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF VIRGINIA FOSTERt
DURR 274-88 (H. Bernard ed. 1985).
171. One of these rebels was Juliette Morgan, a librarian, whose letter to the editor of the Mont-
gomery Advertiser represents a remarkable instance of individual courage and an eloquent tribute to
the protest. "It is hard to imagine," she wrote:
a soul so dead, a heart so hard, a vision so blinded and provincial as not to be moved with
admiration at the quiet dignity, discipline, and dedication with which the Negroes have con-
ducted their boycott .... Their cause and their conduct have filled me with great sympathy,
pride, humility, and envy. I envy their unity, their good humor, their fortitude, and their
willingness to suffer for great Christian and democratic principles, or just plain decent
treatment.
Quoted in J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 102-03. After the publication of her letter, Morgan was
engulfed by slurs and threats. A little less than two years later she committed suicide. Id. at 103; D.
GARROW, supra note 23, at 635 n.15.
172. See M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 209; J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 101-04.
173. J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 119-20. According to Virginia Durr, many white women
rejected the Mayor's plea. "They said, okay, if [he] wants to come out here and do my washing and
ironing and cleaning and cooking and look after my children, he can do it, but unless he does, I'm
going to get Mary or Sally or Suzy." OUTSIDE THE MAGIC CIRCLE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
VIRGINIA FOSTER DURR, supra note 170, at 282.
174. See M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 126; J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 112, 119. When
the Police Commissioner joined, the Montgomery Advertiser noted that "[i]n effect, the Montgomery
police force is now an arm of the White Citizens Council." D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 52.
175. See N. MCMILLEN, supra note 76, at 42-44.
176. See N. BARTLEY, supra note 37, at 106; Maund, Monster Rally at Montgomery, NATION,
Feb. 18, 1956, at 128.
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MIA leaders were threatened,1 7 and verbal intimidation was quickly su-
perseded by potentially lethal force as bombs were detonated at the homes
of King and Nixon. 
1 7
A second strategy involved efforts to resuscitate the divisiveness that had
characterized the political life of black Montgomery before the boycott.
Rumors were planted accusing King of exploiting the boycott for personal
gain. Leading white citizens suggested to older, conservative blacks that
they were being unfairly overshadowed by an ambitious, young outsider.
Mayor Gayle attempted to bypass King and the MIA altogether by reach-
ing an agreement with three black ministers unaffiliated with the protest
to end the boycott. These measures, however, were largely ineffective.
Support for King within virtually all sectors of the black community grew
over the course of the struggle. Not only did blacks, following the direc-
tion of the MIA, disregard the alleged settlement, but, under community
pressure, the three ministers who met with the Mayor publicly disavowed
having reached an agreement in the first place. 79
A third strategy involved harassment and punishment. The local mili-
tary draft board reclassified the draft status of Fred Gray, the MIA's
principal local attorney. 80 The local prosecutor initiated (but later
dropped) criminal proceedings against Gray for barratry.' The police,
aided by deputized unemployed bus drivers, ticketed black motorists in
unprecedented numbers for speeding, waiting too long at stop signs, not
waiting long enough, or overloading vehicles with passengers.18 King
himself was arrested and jailed for allegedly driving thirty miles per hour
in a twenty-five mile per hour zone. 83
177. See M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 132-34.
178. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 59-62; M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 135-38.
179. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 54-55.
180. Gray was issued an induction order but successfully petitioned to have it cancelled by the
Director of the Selective Service System. The Director's cancellation order only had the effect of
remanding the case to the local draft board for re-evaluation. The authorities in Montgomery refused,
however, to reopen the case, and three members of the draft board resigned to protest the Director's
intervention. See 2 RACE RM.. L. REP. 255 (1957) (exchange of letters between Senator Richard
Russell of Georgia, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, and
General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of Selective Service System, regarding draft status of Fred D.
Gray); J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 141; Interview with Fred D. Gray in Tuskegee, Alabama
(Aug. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Fred Gray Interview].
181. Gray was accused of including a woman as a plaintiff in a lawsuit without her authoriza-
tion. The suit led to the invalidation of bus segregation statutes. See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp.
707 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). It seems likely that the woman was coerced by her
employer into making the charge. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 63-64; L. REDDICK, supra note
131, at 120-21; J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 142-43; B. RUSIN, supra note 149, at 55, 56.
Some have suggested that the case was dropped because the state prosecutor determined that he lacked
jurisdiction over the matter since the suit Grey filed was a federal action. L. REDDICK, supra note
131, at 120-21; Fred Gray Interview, supra note 180.
182. J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 123.
183. D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 55-56.
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III. THE BOYCOTT IN COURT
A. The Trial of Martin Luther King
As the boycott wore on, courts became a central locus of struggle. In-
creasing their pressure, authorities prosecuted King for violating a state
law that criminalized conspiring "without a just cause or legal excuse" to
hinder a business."" Eighty-nine MIA dissidents were also indicted, but
King was the only one tried.185
Intended to suppress the Negro rebellion, the prosecution had precisely
the opposite effect. It spurred the black community to further displays of
unity, confidence, and self-sacrifice.188 Defendants joyously turned them-
selves in to the police.18 As King put it, "[tihose who had previously
trembled before the law were now proud to be arrested for the cause of
freedom."18 Being arrested or jailed pursuant to the protest had become a
badge of honor. The day the boycott leaders were arraigned, most of
Montgomery's blacks shunned all motor transportation as a gesture of
respect and solidarity.' 9
The prosecution also advanced the cause of the boycott by elevating it to
a major item of national and international news. For the first time, King
and the boycott movement appeared on the front page of the New York
Times and received notice by network television. 90 The heady feeling of
being at the center of the world's attention further encouraged Montgom-
ery's rebellious black population.
The trial took place in the Circuit Court of Montgomery, Alabama,
lasted four days-March 19-22, 1955-and was presided over by Judge
Eugene W. Carter, who also served as the finder of fact since both parties
consented to a non-jury trial. Judge Carter was familiar with the case; he
had, on his own motion, brought to the attention of the grand jury the
184. ALA. CODE § 54, tit. 14 (1940) (presently codified as ALA. CODE § 13A-11-122 (1975))
reads in pertinent part:
Two or more persons who, without a just cause or legal excuse for so doing, enter into any
combination, conspiracy, agreement, arrangement or understanding for the purpose of hinder-
ing, delaying or preventing any other persons, firms, corporation or association of persons from
carrying on any lawful business shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
185. Thornton, supra note 48, at 225.
186. At the time, a magazine correspondent presciently predicted that in bringing the prosecution,
the white Establishment had made a "fatal mistake" for "the indictments made martyrs out of the
leaders of the movement and completely fused the Negro citizens into a jubilant, hymn-singing, firmly
determined group." See Alabama. . .Why Race Relations Could Grow Even Worse, NEWSWEEK,
March 5, 1956, at 24, 26.
187. See M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 146 ("At the jail, an almost holiday atmosphere pre-
vailed. . . .No one had tried to evade arrest. Many Negroes had gone voluntarily to the sheriff's
office to see if their names were on the list [of defendants], and were even disappointed when they
were not."); L. REDDICK, supra note 131, at 137-38.
188. M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 146.
189. See J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 155; Maund, We Will All Stand Together, THE NA-
TION, March 3, 1956, at 168.
190. D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 66; L. REDDICK, supra note 131, at 139-41.
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question of whether the boycott violated state law. 91 He was familiar
with the case in a broader sense as well. After Rosa Parks' conviction in
the city Recorder's Court, she had appealed to the Circuit Court, where
Judge Carter again found her guilty of violating state and municipal
law.1"2 His decision involved more than simply following precedent. He
was himself an ardent segregationist who once sponsored a resolution at
his church barring Negroes from the premises unless they were perform-
ing janitorial services. 193
The prosecutor, County Solicitor William Thetford, recalls having dis-
favored bringing criminal actions against the boycott leaders."9 His reluc-
tance was not based on any qualms regarding the legalities of the matter.
He simply believed that criminal prosecution would prove to be inade-
quately repressive since conviction would probably result in only small
fines or brief jail sentences, a price the boycott leaders were gladly willing
to pay. He therefore counselled the bus company to take action itself
against the MIA.
19 5
Crenshaw vetoed Thetford's recommendation. He declined to seek an
injunction because doing so would have entailed, in his view, abandoning
the Company's position as an innocent, neutral party.196 It is difficult to
fathom what he had in mind. Bringing the suit that Thetford suggested
would not have necessitated directly taking sides with respect to the pri-
mary substantive issue in question-state-mandated racial segregation. All
the Company needed to argue was that it was being irreparably injured
by a boycott that violated state law and that its rights could only be se-
cured by equitable relief. For the reasons Thetford outlined, obtaining
injunctive relief would have been a more effective avenue of attack against
the boycott. Inexplicably, Thetford waited several months (by which time,
it was too late to matter) before he followed a variant of his own advice
and sought an injunction in the name of the City against the MIA.197
That delay played a crucial role in the outcome of events.
The attorneys for the defense-Fred Gray, Arthur Shores, Peter Hall,
and Orzell Billingsley-were the leading black attorneys in the state.' 98
191. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 63; J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 141; Thornton,
supra note 48, at 224.
192. See Parks Transcript, supra note 110, at 4-5.
193. See Montgomery Boycott: New Phase, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 1956, at 149.
194. See Thornton, supra note 48, at 224 n.60.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See infra text accompanying notes 290-93.
198. Fred Gray was particularly important in the litigation associated with the boycott. A native
of Montgomery, he was well-acquainted with most of the major actors in the drama and was natu-
rally looked to for legal assistance when trouble arose. Prohibited by segregation from attending law
school in Alabama, Gray earned his law degree at the Western Reserve University Law School in
Cleveland, Ohio, in 1954. When he represented Rosa Parks and then Martin Luther King, he was
only twenty-five years old and one year out of law school. Gray subsequently participated in a num-
ber of important civil rights cases arising in Alabama. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
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The NAACP volunteered its General Counsel, Robert Carter,199 to help
with the defense, but Judge Carter would not allow him to participate in
the examination of witnesses. The judge justified his decision on the
grounds that the case involved only a misdemeanor, that Carter was not a
member of the Alabama Bar, and that the defendant was adequately rep-
resented by local counsel.200
1. The Prosecution's Case-In-Chief
The prosecution's case-in-chief consisted of testimony that was appar-
ently intended to show that the MIA was founded for the sole purpose of
sustaining the boycott, that it was well-organized and funded, that King
controlled the organization, that the MIA had rejected compromises of-
fered by the Company and the City, and, finally, that Negroes stayed off
the buses largely because of physical intimidation by the MIA. To estab-
lish the most damning of these allegations-the charge of intimida-
tion-the prosecution first called ten whites as witnesses, each of whom
testified that he was driving or riding on a bus in early December 1955
when it was struck by stones or gunfire. None of these witnesses offered
testimony identifying or even describing the alleged assailants. They
merely noted that the attacks occurred in black neighborhoods. Because no
testimony linked either the MIA or King to the violence, the defense per-
(1960) (holding unconstitutional redistricting plan that discriminated against Negro voters). For bio-
graphical information on Fred Gray, see L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 150-52.
Arthur Shores was the senior member of the group of lawyers defending King. For about twenty
years, he was the only black attorney in Alabama. He participated in a wide variety of important
cases during the era of the civil rights movement; see, e.g., Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D.
Ala.) (desegregation involving University of Alabama), rev'd, 350 U.S. 1, on remand 228 F.2d 619
(5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956). See H. RAINES, supra note 108, at 384-87; A.
WESTIN & B. MAHONEY, THE TRIAL OF MARTIN LUTHER KING (1974); Deitch, Interview with
Arthur Shores (Summer 1985) (on file with author).
Peter Hall and Orzell Billingsley assisted Arthur Shores. Later they served as lead counsel in a
number of significant civil rights cases. They distinguished themselves in particular for persistently
challenging the exclusion of Negroes from juries in Alabama. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202 (1965).
The history of the participation of black lawyers in the civil rights movement is a story that remains
largely untold. Sorely needed is information about their educational background, relations with local
bar associations and local courts, the nature of their law practices, and their self-perceived role in the
movement.
199. Robert Carter was a leading member of the extraordinary cadre of lawyers assembled by
Thurgood Marshall to attack segregation through litigation. By 1955, Carter had served as counsel in
a number of landmark cases, including Brown v. Board of Education. For biographical information
on Carter, see R. KLUGER, supra note 49.
200. See King Transcript, supra note 110, at 11. Perhaps Judge Carter was even-handedly ap-
plying a custom of local practice that solely involved an effort to support local lawyers. But consider-
ing that local counsel moved for the temporary admission of attorney Carter, that attacks upon the
civil rights bar were already beginning to multiply in southern jurisdictions (particularly Alabama),
and that throughout the trial the judge clearly favored the prosecution, it is reasonable to suspect that
the exclusion of Robert Carter was but another manifestation of Judge Carter's segregationist lean-
ings. On the legal issues implicated by hostility to out-of-state counsel in civil rights actions, see Note,
Retaining Out-of-State Counsel: The Evolution of a Federal Right, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 734-37
(1967).
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sistently objected to this testimony on the grounds that it lacked any rea-
sonable evidentiary relationship to the indictment. Their objections, how-
ever, were typically overruled.201
The prosecution also called as witnesses three blacks who claimed to
have been harassed by boycotters. The first, Willie Carter, claimed that
he was told that he would be beaten if he rode on a bus.20 2 Judge Carter
sustained an objection to his testimony on the grounds that it failed to
reveal a link between the person who allegedly threatened Carter and ei-
ther King or the MIA.2"'
Quickly thereafter, however, Judge Carter abandoned conventional evi-
dentiary standards. Ernest Smith testified that a week after the boycott
began, a man tried forcibly (albeit unsuccessfully) 0 ' to prevent him from
boarding a bus."' This testimony should have met the same fate as Willie
Carter's, for again no connection was established between the alleged al-
tercation 0" and King or the MIA. Judge Carter, however, overruled de-
fense objections to Smith's testimony.207
The third witness, Beatrice Jackson, testified that in February 1956,
she was attacked by a man (presumably black) who allegedly hit her, cut
her finger, and threatened that if he caught her riding a bus again he was
going "to cut [her] damn throat."' ' Her testimony, too, was devoid of
anything that linked her alleged assailant to either King or the MIA. But,
over objections, Judge Carter admitted it into evidence as well.20 '
2. The Defense
The case-in-chief of the defense consisted primarily of putting the
Montgomery City Lines on trial. First, the defense elicited testimony indi-
cating that for several years prior to the boycott, the Negro community
had expressed its dissatisfaction to the Company and the city commission-
ers. Next, it brought to the stand witnesses who testified about racially
201. See King Transcript, supra note 110, at 161-212.
202. Id. at 213-16.
203. Id. at 216.
204. According to Smith, the incident amounted to this:
I went to step on the bus and a man standing there just pulled me back and said I wasn't
going to get on. I got down and turned around and knocked him down. I got on the bus and
when it turned the corner he still was laying down there.
Id. at 217. Smith went on to testify that after this altercation he was not bothered again. Id. at
217-18.
205. Id. at 216-22.
206. No corroborating evidence was offered supporting Smith's account. Moreover, cross-
examination revealed that he was a courthouse employee. Id. at 217. These considerations do not
establish that Smith was lying. They should give one pause, however, before accepting his story at
face value.
207. Id. at 218.
208. Id. at 223.
209. Id. at 224.
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motivated mistreatment they had seen or suffered on the buses. During
Sadie Brook's examination, for instance, the following exchange occurred:
Q: Have you heard the drivers call the negroes any names?
A: I have.
Q: What are some names you heard?
A: "Black bastard," and "back up nigger, you ain't got no damn
business up here, get back where you belong.""'0
Memories of verbal insults emerge repeatedly in the testimony of other
defense witnesses as well:
Q: Have you heard the bus drivers call the negroes any names?
A: Yes, sir, I have.
Q: What do they call them?
A: They call them niggers.
Q: What else do they call them, have you heard any other
expressions?
A: Yes, sir, . . . "Apes. 211
In addition to verbal insults, witnesses recounted other bitter memories.
Richard Jordan spoke of the time that he and his obviously pregnant wife
were forced to vacate two otherwise unoccupied seats in the white section
of the bus.212 Martha Walker recalled an occasion on which she and her
husband, a blind veteran who was on his way to obtain treatment at a
Veterans Administration hospital, left a bus because the driver had rudely
ordered them to the rear of the vehicle. 1 Joseph Alford testified that a
bus driver directed him to enter a bus by the rear after he had paid in the
front; the bus then pulled off before he had a chance to reach the back
door.21'
The second aspect of King's defense received far less elaboration than
the first. It was based upon testimony regarding King's and the MIA's
commitment to moral suasion rather than physical intimidation. Reverend
Robert Graetz, one of the few white Montgomerians to support the boy-
cott publicly, testified that he had never heard King or any other member
of the MIA threaten anyone who decided to ride the buses.215 King him-
self stated that he neither practiced nor encouraged violence, and that,
with respect to influencing other blacks' commuter habits, his only advice
had been "let your conscience be your guide."2 16
210. Id. at 362; see also id. at 368, 370.
211. Id. at 374; see also id. at 368, 370, 379, 396, 403, 409, 414, 439-40, 456, 458, 462-63, 470,
476-77, 479, 481-82.
212. Id. at 363.
213. Id. at 392-93.
214. Id. at 477.
215. Id. at 484.
216. Id. at 494.
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3. The Benefits of the Trial Despite the Verdict
Although the verdict, as expected, went against King,2"' his constituents
derived significant benefits from the trial, just as they had benefitted from
the mass indictments. Trials presented one of the few arenas in the South
where black professionals could meet their white counterparts in open
competition. The tenacious defense offered by King's attorneys bolstered
their own confidence and, by extension, the self-esteem of the black com-
munity as a whole. His lawyers provided a substantial psychological vic-
tory when they matched, or frequently outshined, their white counter-
parts, and when they succeeded in eliciting respect even from hardline
segregationists. Silent applause erupted from the blacks in the courtroom
when Mayor Gayle answered "No, sir," to a question propounded by one
of "their" attorneys.218
The trial also facilitated the public airing of two aspects of southern
race relations which, according to segregationists, did not even exist: the
systematic mistreatment of Negro citizens and widespread opposition
among Negroes to the segregation regime. Solicitor Thetford called to the
stand as rebuttal witnesses bus drivers who swore that they had never
called blacks "niggers" nor encountered any racial difficulties. One re-
counted that he had even been accused by whites of showing undue favor-
itism to blacks.219 Others testified that they had applied the customs and
rules of segregation even-handedly, ousting whites from seats in the black
section of the bus just as blacks had been ousted from seats in the white
section. These efforts of rebuttal, however, were no match for the testi-
mony given by the black Montgomerians who related the outrages com-
mitted against them. Their testimony further eroded the myth of symme-
try that had long sustained the separate but equal doctrine. It belied the
comforting assertion of the white power structure that, except for the agi-
tation of a few troublemakers, segregation was acceptable to both whites
and blacks. This testimony helped to create the image that, more than any
other, publicized the iniquity of segregation: the image of a bus driver
ordering a person to the back of the bus on account of nothing more than
the color of her skin.
4. Problems in the Defense
The conduct of the defense was not without its problems. The first was
rather straightforward: the transcript of the trial reveals that in several
217. King was assessed court costs and fined $500. Id. at 577. When he indicated that he would
not pay the fine, Judge Carter sentenced him "to hard labor in Montgomery County for 140 days for
the fine and 246 additional days for the [court] cost." Id. at 2. Later, someone paid the fine on King's
behalf. Fred Gray Interview, supra note 180.
218. See L. REDDICK, supra note 131, at 142.
219. King Transcript, supra note 110, at 512.
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instances defense attorney Orzell Billingsley wholly neglected to familiar-
ize himself with his own witnesses. On one occasion, for instance, he
called to the stand for purposes of illustrating recent driver misconduct a
woman who testified, to his evident surprise, that she had not ridden a bus
since 1946.220
The second problem is more complicated. It stems from the ambivalence
of a defense torn between a strategy of putting the Company on trial and
a strategy of evading the prosecution's charges by denying the allegation
that King and the MIA had organized a boycott. Throughout the trial,
witnesses friendly to the defense claimed that they were unable to recall
what King had stated at MIA mass meetings or even whether he had
spoken at all at meetings they had attended. Some witnesses suggested,
moreover, that the boycott was not really a boycott at all but rather a
concatenation of individual decisions that happened to have been made at
around the same time.
The most striking example of this strategy of evasion was King's own
testimony. He claimed, for instance, that he had not urged Montgomeri-
ans to refrain from riding the buses.221 But, as the prosecution pointed
out, the founding resolution of the MIA expressly called upon "every citi-
zen in Montgomery, regardless of race, color or creed, to refrain from
riding buses" until a suitable understanding had been established with the
Company.222
The problem with the strategy of evasion was that it rested upon an
obvious falsity.223 This raises the thorny question whether, or to what
extent, King and his allies owed a moral obligation of truthfulness to in-
stitutions that oppressed them.224 Lying would seem to pose something of
a quandary for a protest that derived much of its inner and outer strength
from its sense of moral purity.225 Furthermore, given that King's convic-
tion was virtually certain no matter how he portrayed his role in the pro-
test, the question arises why he adopted a position at trial so at odds with
the candid defiance and plain-spoken eloquence that had helped to make
the boycott the extraordinary event it had become. Perhaps he deemed
evasion necessary to protect participants in the protest; to have been open
and forthright on the witness stand might have risked exposing vulnerable
people to extra-legal retribution.226 Perhaps, if pressed, King would also
220. Id. at 445; see also id. at 397-401, 435-37.
221. Id. at 494.
222. Id. at 501.
223. See T. BRANCH, supra note 33, at 185 ("defense testimony flirted with perjury").
224. See M. WALZER, The Obligations of Oppressed Minorities, in OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON
DISOBEDIENCE, WAR AND CITIZENSHIP 46 (1970).
225. See S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978).
226. It was necessary, for instance, to keep secret the crucial role that Jo Ann Gibson Robinson
played in writing, producing, and distributing the first leaflets calling for a boycott. Had her role been
publicly acknowledged, she would certainly have been dismissed from her position as a teacher at the
state-funded, all-black Alabama State College. Dismissal, after all, was the fate that befell other
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have noted that he was being tried, after all, in a court that lacked basic
elements of justice. Although the nature of King's testimony raises an in-
teresting philosophical problem, I shall not pursue it here. At this point, I
simply want to establish that this aspect of King's defense is problematic
and that the eventual victory of King and the MIA in the battle of Mont-
gomery does not mean that everything they did was necessarily proper or
efficacious; victors sometimes triumph despite themselves.
The law under which King was convicted exemplified the long-standing
antipathy of the Alabama state government to dissident mass movements.
It was enacted in 1921 as part of a package of anti-union statutes, 22 7 one
of which-a law that completely prohibited picketing-was invalidated in
1940 by the United States Supreme Court in Thornhill v. Alabama.
228
Had King's attorneys succeeded in having the conviction of their client
reviewed in a federal forum, the case might have become Thornhill II.
They raised a variety of constitutional objections to his prosecution, the
most persuasive of which included the following: (1) the anti-boycotting
statute deprived King of due process of law by failing to apprise him pre-
cisely of the wrong he was charged with committing;229 (2) because King
was "selectively" prosecuted, the application of the law denied him due
process and equal protection; 30 and (3) the statute on its face and as ap-
plied abridged rights protected by the First Amendment.23'
By the time of King's trial, it was well-established as a matter of fed-
eral constitutional law that due process required a statute to be suffi-
ciently clear to provide fair warning to the citizenry and guidance to judi-
cial personnel charged with determining whether a violation had, in fact,
occurred.23 2 Twenty years before King's prosecution, the president of a
labor union in Alabama was charged and convicted of picketing a business
teachers and students at the college who dared to challenge Jim Crow practices openly. See Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 45-52,
168-69; Reddick, The State vs. The Student, 7 DISSENT 219 (Summer 1960). In 1960, Robinson and
scores of her colleagues resigned to protest the continuing repression. J. ROBINSON, supra note 108,
at 169-70.
227. The targeted union-the United Mine Workers of America (UMW)-challenged not only
the hegemony of capitalist managers and their political allies but also, in important respects, the
ideology of segregation. The UMW attempted to effectuate the radical idea of organizing black and
white workers together within the same union. For crossing the color-line on behalf of working-class
interests, Alabama repressed the union with unusual ferocity. See S. GREENBERG, RACE & STATE IN
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 209-26 (1980).
228. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
229. King Transcript, supra note 110, at 7.
230. Id.
231. Id. King's attorneys also asserted that the prosecution violated the Constitution in that it
restrained the free exercise of religion, abridged the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, and enforced segregation laws that themselves violated the Constitution. King's attorneys also
asserted that the anti-boycotting statute on its face and as applied violated the Alabama constitution.
Id.
232. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Connolly v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385
(1926); see generally Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67 (1960).
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"without just cause or legal excuse." In the course of invalidating that
statute, the Supreme Court stated in Thornhill v. Alabama that "[t]he
phrase 'without just cause or legal excuse' does not in any effective man-
ner restrict the breadth of the regulation; the words themselves have no
ascertainable meaning either inherent or historical."233 Three years later,
the Supreme Court of Alabama faced the argument that this very infir-
mity afflicted the state's anti-boycotting law; after all, it too conditioned
the application of criminal law on whether the activity in question was
undertaken without "just cause." Citing Thornhill, the Court of Appeals
of Alabama invalidated the statute. 3 4 The court of appeals was reversed,
however, by the state supreme court. In an opinion that did not add spe-
cific content to the statute's amorphous language, the Supreme Court of
Alabama simply declared that the statute's prohibition against interfering
with another's business "without just cause" was the same as prohibiting
"unlawful interference" 2M5-as if the mere invocation of the word "un-
lawful" solved the problem of vagueness. The difficulty with the statute
was its indefiniteness. The Supreme Court of Alabama failed to resolve
that difficulty but simply papered over it with a term as amorphous as the
one it purported to clarify.
The second objection raised by King's attorneys was that their client
had been singled out for prosecution in a manner that was fundamentally
unfair. This claim is related to the earlier point regarding vagueness. Be-
cause the statute was so indefinite, it greatly enhanced the risk that offi-
cials would use the law to target political rivals or enemies. Justice Frank
Murphy had anticipated this problem in Thornhill when he decried
"[t]he existence of . . .a statute, which readily lends itself to harsh and
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particu-
lar groups deemed to merit their displeasure .. ."28 That state officials
were "out to get" King and the MIA for constitutionally dubious pur-
poses is, in one sense, rather obvious. The White Citizens Councils sys-
tematically and openly boycotted those who resisted segregation.137 Need-
less to say, however, the Councils had no reason to fear state prosecution.
For King and the MIA the situation was different. Announcing King's
indictment, the grand jury declared: "We are committed to segregation by
custom and by law," and "we intend to maintain it."238
A court willing to act upon the obvious might have invalidated King's
conviction on the grounds that, whatever the underlying merits of the case,
Montgomery officials prosecuted King not to effectuate the state's anti-
233. 310 U.S. at 100.
234. See Lash v. State, 244 Ala. 48, 52, 14 So. 2d 229, 231, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 784 (1943).
235. 244 Ala. at 55, 14 So. 2d at 233.
236. 310 U.S. at 97-98.
237. See N. MCMILLEU, supra note 76, at 209-15.
238. Quoted in L. REDDICK, supra note 131, at 136; see also D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 64.
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boycotting statute, but rather to "get tough" with anti-segregationist dissi-
dents. But where officials are charged with selective prosecution, courts
have rarely been willing to recognize the obvious.2" 9 Beset by difficult
problems involving institutional competence and community safety, judges
have condemned invidious prosecution in the abstract but have generally
declined to use judicial remedies against such wrongs.24 °
Any knowledgeable observer of the crisis in Montgomery would have
recognized that the primary motivation behind King's prosecution had lit-
tle or nothing to do with the state's antipathy to boycotts. But it would
have been difficult to prove in a legal sense that the prosecution had im-
properly focused on King while allowing others to violate the law. A small
number of prosecutions had been brought (albeit a decade earlier) against
persons other than black anti-segregationists."' x Furthermore, it could
truthfully be said with respect to King and his co-defendants that no other
group in Alabama history had ever staged such a large and well-
publicized boycott. Finally, the grand jury's affirmation of segregation
simply reflected a conclusion implicit in the indictment itself; insofar as
segregation constituted a lawful policy of the state, opposition to it pro-
vided no "just cause" for a boycott.
2 42
239. See Cardinale & Feldman, The Federal Courts and the Right to Nondiscriminatory Admin-
istration of the Criminal Law: A Critical View, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 659 (1978); Reiss,
Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1365 (1987); Com-
ment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1103
(1961); Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472,
1520-49 (1988).
240.
[T]he right [to nondiscriminatory enforcement of criminal law] seems likely to remain more a
matter of theory than of practical relief in most instances of discrimination, unless the courts
exercise more flexibility in judging attempts to prove discriminatory enforcement. The
problems of proof-including the unlikelihood of obtaining direct proof, the difficulty of amas-
sing sufficiently persuasive statistical evidence to support an inference of intent to discriminate,
and the improbability of securing evidence of motive sufficient to transform a showing that
others have not been prosecuted into proof of purposeful discrimination-are somewhat pro-
hibitive in themselves and may be insurmountable in the face of the present judicial reluctance
to be persuaded that state enforcement agencies have in fact violated the constitutional right to
nondiscrimination.
Comment, supra note 239, at 1141. Particularly relevant to our concerns is that another criminal
prosecution of Martin Luther King helped give rise to this Comment. In 1960, he became the only
person who, until then, had ever been prosecuted for income tax perjury in Atlanta, Georgia. Id. at
1103 n.1.
241. See Lash v. State, 244 Ala. 48, 14 So. 2d 229, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 784 (1943); Threet v.
State, 31 Ala. App. 133, 16 So. 2d 195 (1943).
242. A related issue implicating the fairness of King's trial involves the role of Judge Carter. He
was, see supra text accompanying notes 191-93, a prime mover in obtaining an indictment from the
grand jury. Viewed realistically, his conduct represented nothing less than an effort to bring all of his
resources to bear against the boycott. But the presumption of judicial regularity and the evidentiary
and substantive rules that surround it make proving allegations of judicial bias an exceedingly difficult
task. The record in King's prosecution appears to lack the "smoking gun" quality of evidence that
courts require before accepting claims of judicial misconduct. And while it may seem unfair that
Judge Carter decided the question of King's guilt after having played a role in obtaining his indict-
ment, the case law "generally rejects the idea that the combination [of] judging [and] investigating
functions is a denial of due process . . ." 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.02, at
175 (1958). This applies in the context of criminal as well as administrative proceedings. See
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The third objection raised by the defense was that the prosecution vio-
lated King's First Amendment rights. Whether, or to what extent, a state
may properly regulate consumer boycotts poses difficult legal questions.243
Boycotting, like any other political tool, can be used for both bad and good
causes; wielded by the MIA, it aided desegregation, but wielded by White
Citizens Councils, it aided the old order.2 44 Politically-motivated boycotts
implicate weighty values, including freedom of association, expression,
and political participation.2 45 But they also can impose heavy, perhaps
even crippling, economic losses upon society246 and coerce individuals into
speech or silence, action or inaction that they would otherwise avoid.24
Thus, no ahistorical, noncontextual, normative judgment can properly be
made about a political boycott per se; its legitimacy depends upon the
circumstances in which it occurs.
King was taken aback initially by criticism which equated the MIA's
boycott with those sponsored by the White Citizens Councils. He was
forced, he later recalled,
to think seriously on the nature of the boycott. Up to this time I had
uncritically accepted this method as our best course of action. Now
certain doubts began to bother me. Were we following an ethical
course of action? . . . Is it true that we would be following the
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 56-57 (1975); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1359 (5th ed. 1980) ("[i]t is not objectionable that the trial judge was involved
in some prior proceedings in the case"). How a federal forum would have responded to a challenge to
Judge Carter's conduct would have depended on the degree to which his prior actions constituted
investigation as distinct from prosecution itself. But based on the record, it is doubtful that even a
court sympathetic to King would have been willing to find judicial bias of a sort that entitles a defend-
ant to reversal of his conviction.
243. See Alexander & Schwarzschild, Consumer Boycotts and Freedom of Association: A Com-
ment on a Recently Proposed Theory, 22 SAN DIE-o L. REv. 555 (1985); Harper, The Consumer's
Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and Its Implications for American La-
bor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409 (1984); Madison, Mississippi's Secondary Boycott Statutes: Unconstitu-
tional Deprivations of the Right to Engage in Peaceful Picketing and Boycotting, 18 How. L.J. 583
(1975); Sandifer & Smith, The Tort Suit for Damages: The New Threat to Civil Rights Organiza-
tions, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 559 (1975); Note, The Political Boycott: An Unprivileged Form of
Expression, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1076 [hereinafter The Political Boycott]; Note, Political Boycott Activity
and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 659 (1978) [hereinafter Political Boycott Activity];
Note, The Scope of First Amendment Protection for Political Boycotts: Means and Ends in First
Amendment Analysis: NAACP v. Claborne Hardware Co., 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1273; Note, The
Common-Law and Constitutional Status of Anti-discrimination Boycotts, 66 YALE L.J. 397 (1957)
[hereinafter Anti-discrimination Boycotts]; see also Comment, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman
Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131 (1980); Note, NOW or Never: Is There Antitrust Liability for Non-
commercial Boycotts?, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1317 (1980).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 237-38; see also The Political Boycott, supra note 243,
at 1076 ("Imagine that the Ku Klux Klan in a small southern town has organized a boycott to
encourage merchants to join in pressuring the local government to abandon its plan to more fully
integrate the work force" and that "[tihe boycott victims are black-owned businesses.").
245. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-12 (1982).
246. See Political Boycott Activity, supra note 243, at 659 ("Within a highly organized, indus-
trial, and free market society the potential significance of [political boycott activity] is enormous.").
247. See The Political Boycott, supra note 243, at 1076 ("A political boycott is a coercive mode of
expression that, regardless of its goals, deprives its victims of their freedom to speak and to associate as
they please.").
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course of some of the White Citizens Councils? Even if lasting prac-
tical results came from such a boycott, would immoral means justify
moral ends? Each of these questions demanded honest answers." 8
King eventually concluded that the substantive differences between the
two organizations constituted the most relevant line of distinction. "Our
purposes," King declared, "were altogether different":24
We would use [the boycott] to give birth to justice and freedom, and
also to urge men to comply with the law of the land; the White
Citizens Councils used it to perpetuate the reign of injustice and
human servitude, and urged men to defy the law of the land.25
Had King's attorneys argued the issue, they would probably have insisted
that, in this particular case, the organized, peaceful withdrawal of pa-
tronage, effected without picketing or any other sort of confrontational
activity, constituted a form of speech entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion. Whether they would have prevailed in a federal forum is a close
question, an examination of which reveals another facet of the ambiguous
legal and moral climate that King confronted. On the one hand, in a series
of cases involving efforts to suppress civil rights protests, the Supreme
Court repeatedly invoked the First Amendment to rule in favor of be-
sieged dissidents.25' In 1963, for example, in a decision that finally cleared
the way for the NAACP to operate in Alabama after being shut down by
the state for seven years, Justice Harlan characterized as a "doubtful as-
sumption" the proposition that "an organized refusal to ride on Mont-
gomery's buses in protest against a policy of racial segregation might,
without more, in some circumstances violate a valid state law. . .252 On
the other hand, with respect to Negroes' resort to anti-discrimination con-
sumer boycotts, judges in the 1950's-including some Supreme Court Jus-
tices 253-"appear[ed] inclined to apply the same rigid limitations on eco-
nomic coercion that stifled labor boycotts in the first decades of the
century." 25' Courts issued injunctions and awarded damages on the basis
248. M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 50.
249. Id. at 50-51.
250. Id. at 51.
251. See supra notes 11-16.
252. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
253. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (upholding injunction forbidding civil
rights protesters from picketing stores accused of racial discrimination in hiring).
254. Anti-discrimination Boycotts, supra note 243, at 397-98. During the 1950's, the Court's
response to protests by organized labor was decidedly less protective than its response had been during
the late 1930's and early 1940's. See Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values:
Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 189, 219 (1984); Political Boycott Activ-
ity, supra note 243, at 663-71. This tendency affected the disposition of Hughes v. Superior Court,
339 U.S. 460 (1950), and may well have affected the Court's handling of King's case had it been
preserved for federal review. One factual difference that would have strengthened King's case is that
unlike Hughes and other boycotting cases, no picketing was involved in the Montgomery boycott.
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of findings that without "just cause" the instigators of a given boycott had
interfered with the legitimate expectations of a targeted enterprise. What
was deemed to constitute "just cause" was notably vague and on that
ground alone raised (or should have raised) constitutional problems.255
The concept was defined more by the absence of certain prescribed fea-
tures than by the presence of a given characteristic. Three elements com-
monly viewed as incompatible with just cause were (1) violence, (2) ac-
tions against secondary parties, and (3) attempts to obtain goals that
contravened public policy. 56 Viewing King's prosecution through the
prism of these elements casts light on certain of the boycott's neglected
dimensions.
The issue of violence can be dealt with quickly. We have already seen
that, fairly considered, none of the prosecution's evidence linked King or
the MIA with any violent actions.257 Nearly all of the violence that did
take place was directed against the boycott and not in support of it.2" 8
A bit more complicated is whether the boycott was a secondary boycott,
a widely outlawed genre of concerted activity in which one party boycotts
a neutral party for the purpose of forcing the neutral party into support-
ing the boycotters' demands against the primary target of their action.259
To some extent, the boycott of the buses in Montgomery resembles a sec-
ondary boycott, for the MIA boycotted the Company even though its ulti-
mate complaint was with the City and the state; after all, these were the
entities that enacted the segregation laws, not the Company.26 On the
other hand, on matters besides desegregation, what precludes the protest
from properly being deemed a secondary boycott is that the MIA and the
Company were directly at odds with one another. After all, the MIA de-
manded two things that were wholly within the Company's own power to
provide: courteous treatment by drivers and the employment of Negro
drivers on predominantly black routes. The Montgomery protest, in other
words, was not one in which a boycott was imposed upon an "innocent,"
neutral party; the Company was as much a target of black anger as the
city government.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 229-35.
256. Anti-discrimination Boycotts, supra note 243, at 399.
257. See supra notes 202-09.
258. Even Judge Carter acknowledged that King had worked hard to prevent violence and ex-
pressly refrained from sentencing him to jail for precisely that reason. Thornton, supra note 48, at
227.
259. For a brief but useful introduction to the idea of the secondary boycott in the employment
context, see A. Cox, D. BoK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: CASS AND MATERIAIs 721-89 (9th ed.
1981). Secondary boycotting has frequently been outlawed at common law and by state and federal
statutes. Id. at 721-22. For a recent judicial discussion that displays the continuing hostility of the
legal machinery to secondary boycotts, see NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447
U.S. 607 (1980).
260. See Anti-discrimination Boycotts, supra note 243, at 406 n.61 ("[A]s in the case of the sec-
ondary boycott, the victim of the boycott to end segregation required by statute is not primarily re-
sponsible for the boycotter's grievance.").
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The third analytical wrinkle implicating the "just cause" test involves
determining whether the MIA's demands conflicted with public policy.
The demand for desegregated seating clearly contradicted Alabama's ex-
pressed commitment to racial separation. Federal courts would soon find
that commitment to be a violation of the Constitution. But by boycotting
in advance of that decision, the MIA put the bus company to a difficult
choice between: (1) enforcing segregation and thereby incurring the heavy
financial losses caused by the boycott, or (2) disregarding state law and
thereby risking criminal sanctions and the loss of its franchise in the event
segregation was upheld. Some judges may have considered the imposition
of that choice as itself a form of illicit coercion. After all, the MIA mar-
shalled the black community's economic power in a way that damaged a
utility important to the entire community and did so although a judicial
forum was available to resolve the controversy.2 61 On the other hand, it is
difficult to generate much sympathy for the Company. It had neglected to
discipline its own offensive drivers. It had helped to back itself into a
comer by stubbornly insisting via Jack Crenshaw that the MIA's initial
demands on seating were incompatible with existing segregation laws. It
conducted itself for much of the boycott as an active arm of the state.
There is little doubt that if the prosecution were re-enacted today the
federal judiciary would reverse King's conviction. One basis for this pro-
position is NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,262 a 1982 decision in
which the Supreme Court reversed a million-dollar judgment against the
NAACP that resulted from a suit by white businessmen in Port Gibson,
Mississippi, who accused the local affiliate of the NAACP and its parent
organization of maliciously interfering with their businesses by sponsoring
a boycott. The Court held that the First Amendment protected the non-
violent aspects of the NAACP's boycott. The seven-year boycott in Port
Gibson began in 1966 to protest injustices similar to those underlying the
rebellion in Montgomery a decade before.2"' The contexts are certainly
261. Frederick S. Ball, an influential segregationist attorney in Montgomery, argued this point
strongly in a letter to the editor of the Montgomery Advertiser demanding the boycott leaders'
indictment:
An individual has the right to ride a bus or not as he or she sees fit and that right should not
be interfered with and should be protected by the police. . . . [Blut when certain so-called
leaders call a group together and organize a boycott, they are taking the law into their own
hands and should be prosecuted. Whether the bus company or its drivers have or have not
always themselves obeyed the law and given colored passengers their rights is not the question
at all, because two wrongs do not make a right and there is always legal redress against the
bus company for anything it does wrong. The question is whether the officials whose duty it is
to enforce the law are going to sit idly by and permit the illegal destruction of a transportation
system which is most certainly needed by both races.
Quoted in Thornton, supra note 48, at 221. See also Anti-Discrimination Boycotts, supra note 243, at
405-07.
262. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
263. The NAACP's demands in Port Gibson, Mississippi, in 1966-more than a decade after the
boycott in Montgomery-illustrate the painfully slow pace of change that confronted impatient activ-
ists in the Deep South throughout the Second Reconstruction. Describing the petition bearing the
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distinguishable. The case against King involved a criminal prosecution;
the case against the NAACP, a civil action. The case against King was
predicated on nothing more specific than that he had led a political boy-
cott lacking "just cause." The case against the NAACP was far more
clearly based on findings that the boycott had been enforced, in part, by
physical intimidation and violence directed by protesters against blacks
who continued to patronize white-owned establishments." 4 Each of these
distinctions would favor King. If the civil suit against the NAACP in
Claiborne Hardware violated the First Amendment, the same would be
true afortiori with respect to Alabama's criminal prosecution of Martin
Luther King. Although elements in the prosecution of King may have
enabled federal appellate courts to turn it into a vehicle for broadening
Thornhill or anticipating Claiborne Hardware, the case actually
amounted to nothing in terms of clarifying or creating federal constitu-
tional doctrine. The case never made it to a federal forum; King lost his
right to appeal because his attorneys filed the required papers tardily.265
In addition, there were no follow-up prosecutions, a consequence, accord-
ing to King, of a deal in which the state dismissed charges against whites
accused of perpetrating acts of racial violence. 66
demands, Justice John Paul Stevens relates that:
it called for the desegregation of all public schools and public facilities, the hiring of black
policemen, public improvements in black residential areas, selection of blacks for jury duty,
integration of bus stations so that blacks could use all facilities, and an end to verbal abuse by
law enforcement officers. It stated that "Negroes are not to be addressed by terms as 'boy,'
'girl,' 'shine,' 'uncle,' or any other offensive term, but as 'Mr.,' 'Mrs.,' or 'Miss,' as is the case
with other citizens.
See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 899.
264. The Supreme Court's articulation of the underlying facts of Claiborne Hardware was gener-
ous to the petitioner. See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912 ("Through speech, assembly,
and petition-rather than through riot or revolution-petitioners sought to change a social order that
had consistently treated them as second-class citizens."). For an interpretation of the facts that high-
lights the physically coercive features of the boycott, see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So.
2d 1290, 1297-1300 (Sup. Ct. Miss. 1981). Both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of Mississippi accentuated the facts that best supported their respective judgments. However, it
is clear that the boycott in Port Gibson was carried out with far less committment to non-violent
moral persuasion than its predecessor in Montgomery. King appealed to the moral conscience of his
constituency. In Port Gibson, by contrast, boycott leader Charles Evers informed his consitueny that
"if we catch you going in those racist stores we're gonna break your damn neck." Brief of Respon-
dents, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., reprinted in 131 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-1981 TERM SUPPLE-
MENT 164 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1983); see also Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 934-40.
265. See King v. State, 98 So. 2d 443 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957); Fred Gray Interview, supra note 180.
266. After the MIA succeeded in desegregating Montgomery's buses, the homes of various MIA
leaders were bombed. See infra text accompanying note 349. King maintains that charges against
some of those suspected of participating in the bombings were dropped in conjunction with the deci-
sion to forego prosecuting his co-defendants. M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 183-84. Fred Gray sug-
gests that the authorities decided that, in light of. the defense mounted on King's behalf, it would
simply be too expensive to proceed against the others. Fred Gray Interview, supra note 180.
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B. City of Montgomery v. Montgomery City Lines
After King's trial, three other court cases significantly affected the
course of the boycott. The first, City of Montgomery v. Montgomery City
Lines,26 7 displayed a deep fissure in the white power structure. At the
beginning of the boycott, the Company and the city commissioners re-
sponded in concert to the MIA's challenge. As the economic pressure on
the Company increased, however, that unity deteriorated. Because blacks
constituted at least seventy percent of the Company's riders,2"" their with-
drawal of patronage constituted a potentially crippling loss of revenues.
To stem its losses, the Company suspended service over the Christmas
holidays in 1955, reduced service thereafter, and obtained an increase in
fares.26 As the financial pinch intensified, the Company distanced itself
from its earlier embrace of segregationism.2 70 "We would be tickled if the
law were changed," the Company's president declared early in April
1956. "We are simply trying to do a transportation job, no matter what
the color of the rider."'27 ' Later that same month, the Company attempted
to avoid further financial losses by publicly directing its drivers to discon-
tinue enforcing segregation.2 72 One consequence of the Company's action
was the resignation of its counsel Jack Crenshaw, the lawyer whose ad-
vice had helped create the impasse from which Montgomery City Lines
sought to extricate itself.
273
City and state authorities reacted strongly. Commissioner Sellers an-
nounced that police would arrest bus drivers who permitted desegregation
and passengers who sat with passengers of another race.274 The President
of the Alabama Public Service Commission informed the parent company
of Montgomery City Lines that its subsidiary must adhere to state policy
regarding segregation in transportation "or suffer the consequences. "275
Finally, when Montgomery City Lines refused to rescind its new policy,
the City sought an injunction in the county court to prohibit the Company
from disregarding city and state segregation requirements. 76
Montgomery City Lines claimed that it had "no choice" 277 but to disre-
gard state and local law because of a ruling-Flemming v. South Caro-
267. Reprinted in 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 534 (1956).
268. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 26.
269. See id. at 31, 53; L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 527-28. One report in January 1956 put the
Company's losses at more than $3,000 per day. D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 53.
270. L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 528-31.
271. Id. at 528.
272. See 1 RACE REL. L. REP. at 535 (quoting memorandum to employees announcing that
"drivers will no longer assign seats to passengers by reason of their race").
273. L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 531.
274. Id. at 529.
275. Quoted in id. at 530.
276. Id. at 530-31.
277. 1 RACE REL. L. REP. at 535.
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lina Electric & Gas Co. 2" 8-in which a federal court of appeals had held
that South Carolina's requirement of segregation on buses violated the
Constitution. As part of its decision,. the court of appeals reinstated the
complaint of a Negro woman who had sued the local bus company for
damages because its agents had compelled her to change seats pursuant to
the unconstitutional state law. The Supreme Court summarily dismissed
the bus company's appeal.27 9 Montgomery City Lines interpreted the Su-
preme Court's action as a ruling invalidating segregation in intrastate
transportation?"0 The Company claimed that Flemming meant that it too
would be legally vulnerable to suits for damages if it continued to enforce
segregation.
Perhaps fear of damage awards did really motivate the Company's ac-
tion. At the hearing on the City's application for an injunction, the Com-
pany lawyer stated that if Montgomery City Lines continued to enforce
segregation, it risked being subjected "to damage suits [that] could be mul-
tiplied almost beyond belief." '281 Even if authentic, however, that fear was
probably unwarranted. Lily-white juries would have posed an imposing
obstacle to any campaign aimed at reforming racially discriminatory cor-
porate conduct by threat of litigation." 2 In any event, lawsuits seeking
individual damage awards do not appear to have been seriously considered
278. 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 901 (1956). For a useful descrip-
tion of the Flemming litigation and its role in the desegregation of southern transit, see C. BARNES,
supra note 32, at 117-20.
279. See South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Flemming, 351 U.S. 901 (1956).
280. See I RACE REL. L. RaP. at 535. This view was widely shared and disseminated. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1956, at 1, col. 8. There was a basis for this view. The summary order an-
nouncing dismissal cited Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 U.S. 188 (1929), a case in which the Court had
held that appeals based on frivolous grounds and intended to cause delay would be dismissed. Com-
mentators realized, however, that the Court's action might have merely represented a rather routine
dismissal of an appeal from a nonfinal order; after all, the court of appeals decision had only paved
the way for a trial on the merits. See The Bus Bust, TiME, May 7, 1956, at 36 (describing initial
reports on Flemming as "one of the biggest U.S. news snafus in years"); see also C. BARNES, supra
note 33, at 119; J. GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 83 n.9; L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 528-29.
Although they did not publicly note their beliefs at the time, Chief Justice Earl Warren along with
Justices Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas disagreed with their colleagues and voted to affirm the
court of appeals. C. BARNES, supra note 33, at 244-45 n.34.
281. See Transcript of Hearing, City of Montgomery v. Montgomery City Lines, reprinted in 1
RACE REL. L. REP. 539, 545 (1956). In the wake of Flemming, bus companies in several important
cities, including Richmond and Norfolk, Virginia, Durham and Greensboro, North Carolina, and
Houston and Dallas, Texas, announced that they would no longer enforce segregated seating. See C.
BARNES, supra note 33, at 119-20; J. GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 83 n.9. However, in the core of
the deep south-South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama-politicians
blocked movement toward desegregation. C. BARNES, supra note 33, at 120.
282. In Spears v. Transcontinental Bus System, 226 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 950 (1956), a black who was ordered to the back of a bus on account of race in Mississippi
attempted to avoid bringing his case before what would undoubtedly have been an all-white southern
jury by bringing suit in California where he had purchased his ticket. Although the plaintiff was
riding on a vehicle owned and operated by Continental Southern Lines, a subsidiary of the Transcon-
tinental Bus System, Inc., he attempted to sue Transcontinental itself. A federal district court, sup-
ported by a court of appeals, ruled that the plaintiff had sued "the wrong defendant." Id. at 97.
Because Transcontinental did not exercise authority over Continental Southern's operating proce-
dures, but merely (!) owned it, the courts reasoned that the former, as the parent company, should not
be held responsible for the policies enforced by its subsidiary.
The Yale Law Journal
as an option by the MIA. What would have constituted (and perhaps did,
in fact, constitute) a more realistic fear was the financial burden the boy-
cott imposed; faced with the prospect of indefinite rebellion by its Negro
customers, the Company may well have been seeking some face-saving
way to capitulate.2 83
The Company, however, received no support from the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County, for Judge P.J. Jones ordered it to continue enforc-
ing state and local segregation laws. Judge Jones rejected Flemming, con-
tending that it was "not well reasoned [and] not sound law." 8 It was, he
maintained, "simply the guess of the Fourth Circuit Court of what the
United States Supreme Court will hold." '285 Quoting the language of an
1899 Alabama Supreme Court decision, he asserted that "[i]t is not an
unreasonable regulation to seat passengers so as to preserve order and
decorum, and to prevent contacts and collisions arising from natural or
well known customary repugnances which are likely to breed disturbances
by a promiscuous sitting." 8 ' He did acknowledge the existence of Brown
v. Board of Education-but only barely.28 Far more relevant to him
were the limitations imposed upon the federal government by the Tenth
Amendment:
The Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, mindful of its
obligation to support and maintain the United States Constitution,
must declare that under the Tenth Amendment . . .the power to
regulate the intra-state carriage of passengers on buses in Alabama
is a power reserved to the State of Alabama. It has never surren-
dered this power to the United States government nor given it to the
Supreme Court at Washington, and this Court will not be a party to
filching the power from the State.288
Judge Jones' injunction remained in effect until the Supreme Court itself
decided whether Jim Crow seating aboard intrastate buses remained con-
stitutionally permissible.289
C. City of Montgomery v. Montgomery Improvement Association
The second case involved the City's belated attempt to obtain an injunc-
tion against the operation of the MIA's transportation system. The City
283. According to Professor Barnes, "many transit lines used Flemming as the occasion to...
abandon[] Jim Crow." C. BARNES, supra note 33, at 119.
284. 1 RACE REL. L. REP. at 537.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 536 (quoting Bowie v. Birmingham Ry. & Elec. Co., 125 Ala. 397 (1899)). Interest-
ingly enough, Judge Jones never mentions Plessy v. Ferguson.
287. See I RACE REL. L. REP. at 537.
288. Id. at 538-39.
289. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); see infra text accompanying notes 294-336.
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argued that the MIA lacked a license and other requirements29 for oper-
ating a transportation system. There was little doubt that, absent some
sort of unusual intervention, the City would obtain the relief it sought;
after all, the case would be adjudicated by Judge Carter. The MIA at-
tempted to elicit intervention by applying to federal court for an injunc-
tion restraining the City from taking legal action in state court against the
car pool operation. But Federal District Judge Frank Johnson rejected
the MIA's motion, concluding that the boycotters were not being
"threatened with any injury other than that incidental to the enforcement
of city ordinances" and that their rights could adequately be protected by
the normal course of litigation.29'
In the wake of Judge Johnson's abstention, Judge Carter granted, as
expected, the injunction requested by the City. 2" The Negro community
would probably have been unable to carry on its boycott much longer
without an alternative transportation system. However, on November 13,
1956-the very day that Judge Carter enjoined the MIA from continuing
to operate its car pools-the Supreme Court of the United States, in Gayle
v. Browder,2 93 vindicated the boycotters' legal theory that de jure segrega-
tion on the buses violated the federal constitution.
D. Gayle v. Browder
Gayle v. Browder was the most significant of the suits that arose from
the Montgomery Bus Boycott. Fred Gray filed it February 1, 1956, two
days after King's home was bombed for the first time.29 Gray had previ-
ously asserted the unconstitutionality of bus segregation as a defense to the
prosecution of Mrs. Parks, but had lost the right to appeal that issue be-
cause of a procedural mishap. 95 In Gayle, Gray reasserted the claim but
290. MIA officials applied for a license to operate a transportation system but were refused one
by city officials. L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 497.
291. Browder v. City of Montgomery, 146 F. Supp. 127, 131 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
292. City of Montgomery v. Montgomery Improvement Ass'n, reprinted in 2 RACE REL. L. REP.
123 (1956).
293. 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
294. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 61.
295. See Parks v. City of Montgomery, 92 So. 2d 683 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957). According to the
Court of Appeals of Alabama, prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances were "quasi crimi-
nal" in nature and governed by the rules of state civil appellate procedure rather than criminal appel-
late procedure. The latter did not require that assignments of error be placed in the record filed on
appeal; the former did require assignments of error. Because no errors were assigned in Parks' appeal,
the court of appeals ruled that there existed nothing for it to review, and it therefore affirmed Park's
conviction. Gray feared throughout that the local or state judges would find some way to sabotage his
effort to seek a full adjudication of Park's claim. Fred Gray Interview, supra note 180. Lamont
Yeakey reports that E.D. Nixon had told Gray of an earlier case challenging the constitutionality of
bus segregation in which the state courts delayed action so long that the plaintiff died in the interim
thereby mooting the litigation. L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 502. The rule that the Court of Appeals
invoked, however, seems to have been a bona fide regulation that it had invoked before in non-racial
contexts against other appellants. See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Birmingham, 39 So. 2d 693 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1948); Ekornes v. City of Mobile, 37 So. 2d 433 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948).
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this time in a federal, as opposed to a state, court and on behalf of a
plaintiff instead of a defendant.
Why did the MIA wait almost two months after Mrs. Parks' conviction
before again challenging the constitutionality of bus segregation? King,
Gray, and other MIA leaders were certainly aware of the opportunity for
legal attack via motions for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
Clifford Durr, a progressive white lawyer in Montgomery, urged this
course of action, as did Robert Carter and other NAACP activists.29 In-
deed, the NAACP refrained from providing financial support to the boy-
cott in its early stages precisely because the MIA refused initially to in-
clude within its demands the abolition of segregation.197  King later
expressed a preference for handling racial conflict through negotiation or
mass action rather than litigation.2 9 At the time of the boycott, however,
neither he nor any of the other leaders of the MIA articulated clearly the
strategic calculations that led them to delay initiating the court proceed-
ings which ultimately destroyed the legal basis of the City's
recalcitrance.
299
One consideration that helps to explain the protesters' initial reluctance
to sue is that they actually believed that the white power structure would
strike some sort of compromise with them once it perceived the depth of
their dissatisfaction with the situation on the buses.300 A concomitant part
of that expectation and strategy involved requesting something that the
local authorities could deliver legally-the amelioration, as distinct from
the abolition, of segregated seating. It took time for King and his associ-
ates to realize that even that modest reform would appear imprudent and
threatening in the eyes of many whites insofar as it represented a public
demand that had been buttressed by black collective action.
Another consideration involved the social meaning of lawsuits. In
Montgomery in 1955, filing a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
296. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 59; L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 501-03.
297. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 53; R. WILKINS, STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRA-
PHY OF Roy WILKINS 228 (1982).
298. Speaking in 1957, soon after the beginning of desegregated seating aboard buses in Mont-
gomery, King stated that "[w]herever it is possible, we want to avoid court cases in this integration
struggle." Quoted in D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 87. On some occasions when he expressed this
view, he seems to have been suggesting that because of the confrontational character of litigation, it
should be resorted to only after other modes of persuasion had failed. Id. On other occasions, he
argued that litigation was not confrontational enough. Id. at 91 (quoting King as saying that blacks
should "not get involved in legalism [and] needless fights in lower courts," for that is "exactly what
the white man wants the Negro to do. Then he can draw out the fight. . . . We must move on to
mass action.").
299. Fred Gray suggests that two months does not really constitute "delay." Fred Gray Interview,
supra note 180. His point would be well-taken in certain contexts. But in this instance, given the
urgency of the ongoing boycott and the MIA's explicit reluctance to bring the suit, the term "delay"
seems appropriate.
300. See Thornton, supra note 48, at 230-31 ("bus seating had been one of the areas in which
blacks had genuinely expected that they would be able to make progress").
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state and local segregation statutes was a radical act."' 1 Many observers
now tend to regard the legalistic attack on segregation as a rather con-
servative tactic. But at that time, the lawsuit was equally, if not more,
provocative as the mass boycott. The boycott simply involved, after all, a
mass withdrawal from the color line. It involved doing on a mass basis
what individual blacks who owned cars had long done. In contrast, the
suit attacking the constitutionality of segregation actually envisioned eras-
ing and crossing the color line. The reason that King and the MIA re-
sisted the NAACP's offer to help in such a suit is that they sought to
avoid the reputation that made the NAACP "enemy number one" to seg-
regationists throughout the Deep South. They knew, as Taylor Branch
observes, "that white Alabama would react [to the filing of a suit] as the
social equivalent of atomic warfare."3 2 They therefore reserved their ju-
dicial option until all other avenues of relief failed.
Gayle was brought as a class action on behalf of four named plaintiffs
and "all other Negroes similarly situated."303 Each of the named plaintiffs
had either been asked by a driver or police officer to comply with the
targeted segregation laws or had actually been arrested.0 4 It may appear
in retrospect that Gayle should have been an easy case. After all, the Su-
preme Court had already decided Brown v. Board of Education. 5
Brown, however, meant something far different in 1956 than it does now.
Presently, it looms as a grand transformative decision, "not only a major
event in the history of race relations . . but also a significant moment in
American jurisprudence. 30 6 In 1956, however, its scope was uncertain.
In Brown, Chief Justice Earl Warren declared for a unanimous Court
that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal'
has no place." ' 7 Clearly, the Court could have condemned all statutes
requiring racial segregation, but that is not what it chose to do. Rather,
the Court left open the possibility that de jure segregation might still
"have a place" in fields other than education.
Several federal district judges refused to extend Brown outside the con-
301. Cf. H. HAINES, BLACK RADICALS AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MAINSTREAM, 1954-1970
20-29 (describing how, in context of times, legalistic integrationism was radical).
302. See T. BRANCH, supra note 33, at 160.
303. See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 711 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
304. Id. One had encountered difficulties of a rather unusual sort. Because Susie McDonald was
fair-skinned and blue-eyed, bus drivers had cautioned her against sitting in the section of the bus
reserved for blacks. J. ROBINSON, supra note 108, at 137.
305. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
306. Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 599 (1979). Commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of Brown, the editors of the Yale
Law Journal aptly stated that "no modern case has had a greater impact either on our day-to-day
lives or on the structure of our government." 93 YALE L.J. 981 (1984). Although Brown's status as a
watershed ruling is no longer seriously debated, the struggle over the definition of its holding contin-
ues unabated. Compare Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE
L.J. 995 (1984) with Marshall, A Comment on the Nondiscrimination Principle in a "Nation of
Minorities," 93 YALE L.J. 1006 (1984).
307. 347 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added).
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text of public schooling. In Lonesome v. Maxwell,308 for example, a fed-
eral district judge denied relief to white and black plaintiffs who sought to
enjoin Maryland and the City of Baltimore from segregating blacks at
beaches, bath houses, and swimming pools. The opinion bears none of the
hallmarks of segregationist defiance. It reflects a careful effort to under-
stand Brown, that is, to determine whether the Justices meant to erase de
jure segregation altogether or only in public schooling. Noting that the
Justices in Brown had repudiated the separate but equal doctrine in only
one particular context, the district court decided that, at least with respect
to recreational facilities, Plessy was still good law.309
By the time that the three-judge panel310 in Gayle was ready to an-
nounce its decision, the district court in Lonesome had already been re-
versed by a court of appeals that was subsequently affirmed by the Su-
preme Court."' By that time, the Court had reversed a district court's
refusal to extend Brown to public golf courses."1 ' Yet despite the tilt of
Supreme Court precedent, disposing of Gayle proved to be a difficult and
controversial undertaking.
Judges Richard T. Rives"a' and Frank Johnson 1 forged the majority
that invalidated the city ordinance and state statute compelling segregation
in intrastate transportation. They believed that in light of Brown and sub-
sequent decisions extending Brown to other settings, they could no longer
"in good conscience perform [their] duty as judges by blindly following
[Plessy].' ' 15 They concluded that Plessy had been impliedly overruled and
that there existed "no rational basis upon which the separate but equal
doctrine can be validly applied to public carrier transportation within the
City of Montgomery. ... "I16 The third member of the panel, Judge
308. 123 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1954), rev'd, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), affd per curiam sub nom.
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
309. 123 F. Supp. at 198-206.
310. A three-judge district court was impanelled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 which required
three-judge courts to adjudicate requests for injunctions against state statutes that allegedly violated
the federal constitution. See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 713 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
311. 123 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1954), rev'd, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), affd per curiam sub
nom., Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
312. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954), affd, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.),
vacated, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
313. Judge Rives was a former president of the Montgomery and Alabama Bar Associations who
ruled in favor of black claimants in a wide variety of important and hotly-contested cases throughout
his judicial career. See J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); J. PELTASON, FiFTY-EtGrT LONELY
MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961); F. READ & L. Mc-
GOUGH, LET THEm BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH (1978).
314. Judge Johnson, like Judge Rives, was a native Alabamian. He probably adjudicated more
high-profile civil rights cases during the civil rights movement than any other federal district judge.
He often sided with black claimants and gained a well-earned reputation as a jurist committed to the
protection of federal constitutional rights. See J. BASS, supra note 313; J. PELTASON, supra note 313;
F. READ & L. McGOUGH, supra note 313; T. YARBROUGH, JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN ALABAMA (1981).
315. Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
316. Id.
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Seybourn Lynne317 wrote a passionate dissent. He noted that the Supreme
Court had not seen fit to repudiate Plessy explicitly and complained that
the willingness of lower court judges to disregard Supreme Court prece-
dent in the absence of express directions from the Justices constituted "[a]
comparatively new principle of pernicious implications."31 He acknow-
ledged that "the trend of [the Court's] opinions [was] to the effect that
segregation is not to be permitted in public facilities furnished by the state
itself. ... "' But he insisted that "it does not follow that [segregation]
may not be permitted in public utilities holding non-exclusive
franchises.
3 20
A strong allegiance to stare decisis and hierarchical authority within
the federal judiciary would seem to counsel allowing only the Justices
themselves to overrule Supreme Court precedent. Furthermore, as noted
above, the Brown opinion itself invited a rather narrow reading. Judge
Lynne, however, should have been put on notice by the Court's subse-
quent decisions that the Court meant for Brown to extend beyond the
schoolhouse.3 21 Moreover, his attempt to distinguish Gayle on the basis of
the bus company's non-exclusive franchise was wholly specious; the na-
ture of a given carrier's franchise was irrelevant since the city and state
laws in question compelled all carriers to segregate passengers on the ba-
sis of race.
3 22
The district court rendered its decision on June 5, 1956. But the ruling
led to no concrete change in the conduct of the parties, for the panel
stayed its judgment and award of relief during the pendency of the City's
appeal to the Supreme Court.3 23 For five months after the district court's
decision, the boycott dragged on. Then, finally, on November 13, 1956,
the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion affirming the district
court: Per Curiam: The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is
affirmed. Brown v. Board of Education . . . Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore v. Dawson . . . Holmes v. Atlanta."
'3 24
The Court's summary disposition of Gayle represented the continuation
317. Judge Lynne, also a native Alabamian, was an arch segregationist whose rulings consistently
evinced deep hostility to civil rights claimaints. See J. BAss, supra note 313; J. PELTASON, supra note
313; F. READ & L. McGOUGH, supra note 313.
318. Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 718 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (Lynne, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 720.
320. Id.
321. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. City of Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955).
322. ALA. CODE tit. 48 § 301 (31a) (1940) (as amended) ("All motor transportation companies
. . . carrying passengers for hire in this state. . . shall at all times provide equal but separate accom-
modations on each vehicle for the white and colored races."); MONTGOMERY, ALA., CODE ch. 6 § 10
("Every person operating a bus line in the city shall provide equal but separate accommodations for
white people and negroes on his buses... ").
323. See Browder v. Gayle, reprinted in 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 678, 679 (1956) (suspending
injunction during pendency of appeal).
324. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1957).
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of a strategy the Justices informally formulated immediately after Brown:
policing Brown's enforcement and enlarging its ambit in as low-key and
uncontroversial a manner as possible. 25 The Court's injunction that
Brown be implemented "with all deliberate speed" was one facet of this
strategy.326 Another facet was total avoidance. The Court simply refused,
for instance, to consider a case involving the constitutionality of a state
anti-miscegenation statute even though it had to torture jurisdictional
rules to do so.327 A third element of this strategy was summary treatment
of cases involving the validity of segregation statutes outside the context of
public schooling. Between 1955 and 1960, the Court was forced, on occa-
sion, to confront in a direct and plenary manner the political story that
Brown precipitated. In 1958, for instance, in a dramatic special session,
the Court denied a request from a local school board to further delay
desegregation even though the board accurately warned that enforcing
Brown would risk violence.32 By and large, however, the Justices strove
to avoid public prominence.
The Court's resort to summary dispositions entailed certain costs. Sum-
mary dispositions nourished accusations that the Justices were conducting
themselves in an unprincipled and high-handed manner.329 Moreover, the
failure to explain the basis for their decision retarded public understand-
ing-and perhaps the Justices' own self-understanding-of just what it
was about de jure segregation that made it in all circumstances incompati-
ble with the Constitution. One can also understand how, from a certain
perspective, the Court's judgment is disturbingly bare in light of the gran-
diloquent protest that gave rise to the case; Gayle fails even to mention
that it was effectively overruling Plessy v. Ferguson."'0
325. For a thoughtful and comprehensive discussion of this aspect of the Court's post-Brown deci-
sionmaking, see Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court,
1948-1958, 68 GEo. L.J. 1, 60-73 (1979).
326. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown 11). For an illuminating discus-
sion of the fierce debate that continues to rage over the appropriateness of the Court's remedial order,
see Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983).
327. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam) (motion to recall mandate denied).
This action was harshly criticized by some legal academic commentators. See H. HART & H. WECHS-
LER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SysT.m 660-62 (2d ed. 1973); Gunther, The Subtle
Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on the Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1964); Wechsler, supra note 35, at 34. For a notable defense of the
Court's handling of Naim, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 71, 174 (1962).
328. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see also Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S.
413 (1956); see generally T. FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA-
TION (1984).
329. See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 4 (1957) (by resorting to peremptory rulings, Justices withdrew from
"the arena in which lies the Court's real strength, the arena of reason and documentation" and in-
stead gave battle "with the weapon that is its opponents' choice: the bare assertion."); see also Hart,
The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84,
98-100 (1959); Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term-Foreword: Process of Law, 72 HARV. L.
REv. 77 (1958); Wechsler, supra note 36, at 22-23.
330. Professor Walter Dellinger has memorably articulated this point in lectures he has given on
race relations law. See, e.g., Summary of Comments by Walter Dellinger, in AFRO-AMERICAN AND
King's Constitution
Ultimately, though, a united Court armed the boycotters with the legal
backing that they desperately sought and needed. Whatever costs were
associated with the form of the judgment were probably worth paying if
the alternative would have been a substantial crack in the Court's una-
nimity. Moreover, to some, the very muteness of Gayle spoke volumes in-
sofar as it indicated that, at least for the Justices, the constitutional ques-
tion of de jure segregation was no longer open to real debate.
The Supreme Court's decision did not immediately end the boycott.
The City petitioned the Court to reconsider their ruling and indicated that
it would demand the enforcement of segregation on the buses until all of
its legal avenues for relief had been exhausted.3 The commissioners were
determined to sustain the life of Jim Crow seating to the bitter end. In
contrast, upon learning of the ruling, the MIA immediately decided to
suspend the boycott, though it requested boycotters to delay an actual re-
turn to the buses until all legal resistance by city officials had been over-
come. 3 2 In the meantime, the MIA prepared the black community for the
imminent prospect of desegregated seating, emphasizing in speeches and
leaflets the desirability of peace and good-will. 3 The time had come,
King declared, to "move from protest to reconciliation.3 31 4 On December
17, the Court rejected the City's petition, and on December 20, the official
papers announcing the Court's action were delivered to city officials.3 5
THE EvoLuTboN OF A LIVING CoNsTrrITON 22 (symposium of The Smithsonian Institution and
The Joint Center for Political Studies March 15-16, 1988).
331. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 80-81.
332. Id.
333. See M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 163-69. A mimeographed list of "Suggestions for Inte-
grated Buses" read in part:
Within a few days the Supreme Court Mandate will reach Montgomery and you will be re-
boarding integrated buses. This places upon us all a tremendous responsibility of maintaining,
in face of what could be some unpleasantness, a calm and loving dignity befitting good citizens
and members of our race. If there is violence in word or deed it must not be our people who
commit it.
For your help and convenience the following suggestions are made. Will you read, study and
memorize them so that our non-violent determination may not be endangered ...
Not all white people are opposed to integrated buses. Accept good-will on the part of many.
The whole bus is now for the use of all people. Take a vacant seat ...
Remember that this is not a victory for Negroes alone, but for all Montgomery and the
South. Do not boast! Do not brag!...
Do not deliberately sit by a white person, unless there is no other seat ...
If cursed, do not curse back. If pushed, do not push back. If struck, do not strike back, but
evidence love and good-will at all times.
In case of an incident, talk as little as possible, and always in a quiet tone. Do not get up
from your seat! Report all serious incidents to the bus driver.
For the first few days try to get on the bus with a friend in whose non-violence you have
confidence. You can uphold one another by a glance or a prayer ...
According to your own ability and personality, do not be afraid to experiment with new and
creative techniques for achieving reconciliation and social change.
If you feel you cannot take it, walk for another week or two. We have confidence in our
people. GOD BLESS YOU ALL.
Id. at 164-69.
334. Quoted in id. at 172.
335. Id. at 170.
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Early the next morning, Martin Luther King, Jr., and other leaders of
the boycott boarded a bus and without incident occupied seats near the
front in the section that had previously been reserved for whites only.
33 6
IV. THE LIMITATIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MONTGOMERY
Bus BOYCOTT
The Montgomery Bus Boycott has attained a secure and honored niche
in the Nation's public memory. Indeed, it has become something of a leg-
end. One problem with making legends is that the process engenders a
distortive sentimentality. We must thus be careful to prevent admiration
for the boycott from exaggerating its accomplishments. The concerted
withdrawal of Negro patronage is not what finally desegregated the buses;
successful litigation constituted the decisive action.3 37 The economic pres-
sure of the boycott forced Company officials to break ranks with the city
commissioners. Its moral pressure impelled a few white Montgomerians
to commit the apostasy of actually siding with King. But the boycott on its
own did not succeed in inducing the political authorities to make any sub-
stantial concessions.
3 3 8
Even within the small social space created by the boycott and its attend-
ant litigation, the transition from segregation was slow and difficult.
Browder largely stilled official resistance to desegregation aboard local
buses. Moreover, many white Montgomerians quietly accepted the new
dispensation.3 3 9 But others bitterly and vocally resisted, refusing to sit be-
side Negroes or in what was formerly the Negro section of buses. An
elderly man who stood in the front of a bus despite the presence of vacant
336. Id. at 172-73. Ralph Abernathy, E.D. Nixon, and Rosa Parks were among those who joined
King for the occasion. Also present was Glenn Smiley, a white southern clergyman from Texas who
had come to Montgomery to lend aid to the MIA. Referring to Smiley, King later recalled that he
"rode the first integrated bus in Montgomery with a white minister, and a native Southerner, as my
seatmate." Id. at 173.
337. As Professor Barnes notes:
Ironically, it was the Court ruling in Browder, not the boycott, that finally won desegregation
on Montgomery's buses .... White authorities remained impervious to the adverse publicity
the boycott brought them, to the economic losses it caused local business, and to the moral
pressures of nonviolent resistance. They yielded only when faced with a final mandate from
the Supreme Court.
0. BARNES, supra note 33, at 124; see also A. Lawis, supra note 140, at 71 ("[Slocial protest did not
win a victory unaided in Montgomery. In the end, the determined Negroes of Montgomery had help
from the Supreme Court.").
338. The bus company was a different matter. It quietly hired black drivers soon after the end of
the boycott. Moreover, there is little mention in the memoir literature about driver discourtesy after
the boycott. If racial mistreatment by drivers had remained an appreciable part of life on the buses, it
seems safe to assume that that fact would have been mentioned.
339. This is how King describes his encounter with a driver the morning that Montgomery's
black community returned to the buses:
The bus driver greeted me with a cordial smile. As I put my fare in the box he said:
"I believe you are Reverend King, aren't you?"
I answered: "Yes I am."
"We are glad to have you this morning," he said.
M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 173.
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seats in the rear spoke for a substantial number of whites when he stated
that he "would rather die and go to hell than sit behind a nigger.1
340
Some die-hards even went so far as to incorporate a private club-the
Rebel Club-for the purpose of providing a transportation system avail-
able only to whites. 41
Blacks were often the victims of segregationists' retribution. The eve-
ning that the Supreme Court decided Browder, forty carloads of robed
and hooded Ku Klux Klansmen rode through Negro neighborhoods honk-
ing horns and shining lights into residences.3 42 White "traitors" were
targeted as well. The Alabama Association of White Citizens Councils
urged "the real white people of Alabama never to forget the names Rives
and Johnson.1 343 The judges were deluged with threatening calls and let-
ters. A cross was burned on Judge Johnson's lawn and the gravesite of
Judge Rive's son was desecrated.34'
Segregationist resentment expressed itself in other potentially lethal
forms. Two days after the inauguration of desegregated seating, someone
fired a shotgun through the front door of King's home. 45 A day later, on
Christmas eve, white men attacked a black teenager as she exited a bus.3 46
Four days after that, two buses were fired upon by snipers.3"' In one
sniper incident, a pregnant woman was shot in both legs. 348 Then, on
January 10, 1956, bombs destroyed five black churches and the home of
Reverend Robert S. Graetz, one of the few white Montgomerians who
had publicly sided with the MIA. 49
340. Id.
341. The Rebel Club never explicitly stated that its policy would be racially exclusionary, but
that was clearly the purpose of the undertaking. Membership dues were only one dollar but no one
could become a member unless approved by the club's president or vice-president and its board of
directors. The Rebel Club requested that the City of Montgomery grant it a license to transport its
members on a regular basis throughout the city along scheduled routes. The city commissioners peti-
tioned the federal district court for an opinion as to whether granting the Rebel Club's request would
comply with its previous order enjoining the city's enforcement of segregation on the buses. See 2
RACt REL. L. REP. at 412-15 (1957). The commissioners' petition for instruction was dismissed on
the grounds that federal courts have no jurisdiction to give advisory opinions. Id. at 412. Judges Rives
and Johnson indicated, however, that in their view, if the city granted a franchise to the Rebel Club,
the city would be under an affirmative obligation to see to it that the ciub did not discriminate be-
tween passengers on the basis of race. Id. The Rebel Club's plans then appear to have been
abandoned.
342. See L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 617; Rough Trip by Bus, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 1956, at
49.
343. See J. BAss, supra note 313, at 77.
344. See id. at 78-83; T. YARBROUGH, supra note 314, at 56-61.
345. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 83.
346. See C. BARNES, supra note 33, at 122.
347. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 83.
348. See L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 634.
349. Id. at 86; M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 175-76. Some white segregationists strongly and
sincerely condemned the violence. Governor James E. Folsom announced a $2,000 reward for infor-
mation leading to the apprehension of the perpetrators. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 87. None-
theless, King and others charged publicly and privately that local officials were not doing all that they
could to prevent the violence. Id.
Several whites suspected of perpetrating the bombings were arrested and prosecuted. At their trial,
The Yale Law Journal
The City Comnmission suspended bus service for several weeks on ac-
count of the violence."' When the violence subsided and service was re-
stored, many black Montgomerians enjoyed their newly recognized right
only abstractly; they avoided the anxiety-producing friction that attended
what the segregationists called "race mixing." The boycott had involved
communal withdrawal from the presence of the color line.35' But for a
black rider actually to cross the color line was a different matter that in-
volved an exercise of individual will and personal vulnerability that for
many proved immensely and understandably daunting. For others, the
problem involved a loss of that heightened sense of duty which, during the
protest, had generated such glorious departures from normalcy. In the af-
termath of the boycott the gravitational pull of old habits exerted their
force: "When we first started getting back on the buses I sat up front,"
one former boycotter recalled, 5 ' "[b]ut then I began sitting in the back-I
wasn't afraid or nothing: it's just that I was accustomed to it.
3 53
To the extent that the color line was crossed, the breach extended only
to the buses. 54 In practically every other setting, Montgomery remained
overwhelmingly segregated,355 largely because of the popularity (among
whites) of sentiments like those expressed by Mayor Gayle when he stated
in response to the decision bearing his name:
The recent Supreme Court decisions . . . have seriously lowered the
dignified relations which did exist between the races in our city and
in our state. . . .The difficulties [which the invalidated laws were]
meant to prevent and the dignities which they guard are not changed
here in Alabama by decisions of the Supreme Court. . . .To insure
their defense attorneys called King as a witness and asked him, among other things, whether he had
plotted the bombings to attract contributions to the MIA and whether he had once been intimate with
a white woman. An all-white jury found the defendants not guilty. Id. at 94.
350. See D. GARROW, supra note 23, at 87.
351. One way that blacks had traditionally sought to minimize the humiliations visited upon them
by the Jim Crow regime was to avoid situations in which they would have to be subject to the color
line. As Professor Johnson noted, "[tihe most common type of response to the personal implications of
the race system is that of avoidance. There is manifest in this behavior not only a precautionary effort
to avoid certain types of racial contact, but an attempt to avoid conforming to the patterns of expected
behavior." C. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 267 (emphasis in original). In Montgomery, this tradi-
tional individual remedy was tranformed into a collective enterprise.
352. See Black and White Dominos, THE NEw REPUBUC, Apr. 8, 1957, at 4, 5.
353. Id. According to one historian of the boycott, "desegregated seating emerged on Montgom-
ery's buses gradually. When blacks first returned to the buses, high school and college students and
the better-educated and professional people freely took seats at the front. However, older blacks and
those who worked as laborers and in domestic service tended to sit in the rear." C. BARNES, supra
note 33, at 123; see also M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 182.
354. Five months after the end of the boycott, The New Republic observed that "for a variety of
reasons (some imposed, some willful, some subconscious) the Negro community in Montgomery is
now more segregated than it was before the protest against bus segregation began." Black and White
Dominos, supra note 352, at 4.
355. See M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 181-89.
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public safety, to protect the peoples of both races, and to promote
order in our city we shall continue to enforce segregation." '356
Underscoring their commitment to the old order, the city commissioners
adopted, on March 19, 1957, a city ordinance declaring it:
unlawful for white and colored persons to play together, or, in com-
pany with each other . . . in any game of cards, dice, dominoes,
checkers, pool, billiards, softball, basketball, baseball, football, golf,
track, and at swimming pools, beaches, lakes or ponds or any other
game or games or athletic contests, either indoors or outdoors.
357
In the early 1960's, Montgomery began formally to rescind such laws,
but even that sometimes failed to deprive them of their power. In March
1960, one week after Montgomery rescinded its ordinance requiring seg-
regation in restaurants, ten white college students from Illinois, their pro-
fessor and his wife, and four Negroes associated with the MIA were ar-
rested in a black-owned retaurant merely for eating together and talking
with one another.35 A little over a year later, in May 1961, President
Kennedy was forced to dispatch federal marshalls to Montgomery to quell
violence directed against an interracial group of "Freedom Riders" who
sought to test whether southern jurisdictions were complying with federal
laws that prohibited racial discrimination in interstate transportation. Re-
sentful of the MIA's success in formally desegregating intrastate transpor-
tation, hard-line segregationists became apoplectic in the face of interra-
cial groups of "outsiders" whose stated purpose was to exercise all of the
legal rights they possessed as travellers in interstate commerce. The fol-
lowing description of the attack against the Freedom Riders helps to illus-
trate the extent to which King's hopes for reconciliation in a desegregated
Montgomery were still virtually utopian more than five years after Gayle.
[A] mob of several hundred launched a vicious assault on the riders.
A number of the youths were severely beaten, and one black semi-
nary student. . . was knocked unconscious with baseball bats. John
Lewis [a leading activist who is now a member of the United States
House of Representatives] was hit by a wooden crate and while lying
in the street was served with a state court injunction against the
journey by an Alabama official. The mob assailed reporters and pho-
tographers, black passersby, and whites who appeared sympathetic
to the protesters. One black who was not a Freedom Rider was
doused with kerosene and set afire. John Seigenthaler [an aide to
United States Attorney General Robert Kennedy] was clubbed from
356. Quoted in L. Yeakey, supra note 60, at 621.
357. Montgomery, Ala., Ordinance 15-57 (1957), reprinted in 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 714 (1957).
358. See Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963); Durr, Sociology and the Law: A Field
Trip to Montgomery, Alabama, in SoUTHERN JUSTICE, supra note 32.
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behind while attempting to help one rider get away and was left
unconscious on the sidewalk for nearly half an hour. White ambu-
lances refused to come to the scene."' 9
Even with respect simply to intrastate transportation, segregation did
not immediately end throughout the South in the wake of Gayle. Some
places did desegregate rather quickly. At the beginning of 1957, the
Southern Regional Conference (SRC) reported that 21 southern cities had
ended compulsory segregation in local buses without court action. 6 But
other municipalities adopted many of the same stalling tactics that effec-
tively stymied enforcement of Brown. In some jurisdictions the color line
in seating remained intact as officials insisted that they would maintain
segregation on city buses until courts specifically invalidated their local
ordinances. 6 It was not until 1957-1959 that litigation brought desegre-
gation to the buses of such major southern cities as Miami," 2 New Orle-
ans,3"' and Atlanta."6 ' In other jurisdictions, officials sought to avoid de-
segregation by abandoning openly segregatory laws while enlarging the
discretionary powers of bus drivers who then proceeded to recreate Jim
Crow patterns. The City Commission of Tallahasee, Florida, for instance,
replaced a traditional segregation ordinance with one that made it a crime
to occupy any seat or standing area other than one expressly assigned by
the bus driver."6 5 The drivers allowed the rear of the bus to be non-
segregated, but refused to assign blacks to seats in what had previously
been formally designated as the white section.366
In still other jurisdictions, the color line remained intact persuant to a
strategy of privatization, which entailed rescinding official requirements
for racial separation and allowing private parties to shoulder the burden.
Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co.,3 7 a case arising from Birmingham,
Alabama, shows the move to privatization, displays the way in which
some district judges were willing to allow that strategy to succeed, and
359. C. BARNES, supra note 33, at 163.
360. See A. MORRIS, supra note 33, at 67.
361. See C. BARNES, supra note 33, at 125.
362. See Garmon v. Miami Transit Co., 151 F. Supp. 953 (S.D. Fla. 1957), affd per curiam sub
nom. City of Miami v. Garmon, 253 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1958).
363. Davis v. Morrison, reprinted in 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 996 (1957); Morrison v. Davis, 252
F.2d 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958).
364. Williams v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, reprinted in 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 166 (1959).
365. See Tallahassee, Fla. Ordinance 741, (Jan. 7, 1957), reprinted in 2 RACE. REL. L. REP.
459-61 (1957).
366. See C. BARNES, supra note 33, at 128. A group of blacks disregarded a driver's directions,
were arrested, and raised as a defense the claim that the ordinance was a mere subterfuge imposed to
avoid Gayle. They were convicted, see Speed v. City of Tallahassee (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1957), reprinted in
3 RACE REL. L. REP. 37 (1958), and never suceeded in having these convictions reviewed by a state
appellate court. Perhaps it was the lack of state appellate review that caused the Justices to deny the
defendants' petition for Supreme Court review. Speed v. City of Tallahassee, 356 U.S. 913 (1958).
367. See Boman v. Morgan, reprinted in 4 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1027 (1959), rev'd sub nom.,
Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
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anticipates the doctrinal issues that awaited courts when the Civil Rights
Movement broadened its attack to include not only de jure segregation
but racial discrimination that, in an important sense, really was "private."
After being sued by blacks who were intent upon enforcing Gayle, officials
in Birmingham replaced the city's traditional segregation ordinances with
new provisions making no mention of race. These provisions authorized
carriers to "promulgate such rules and regulations for the seating of pas-
sengers . . . as are reasonably necessary to assure the speedy, orderly,
convenient, safe and peaceful handling of passengers."3 8 They also pro-
vided that a willful refusal to obey the request of a driver enforcing the
company's seating policy constituted a breach of the peace. At the same
time that city officials made these changes, the bus company painted signs
in the front and rear of its buses which read: "White Passengers seat from
front, Colored Passengers from Rear." 8 9 Soon after the signs were
painted, a group of blacks disregarded them by occupying seats near the
front of a bus. When the blacks refused to obey the driver's request that
they move to the back, they were arrested for breach of the peace and
related infractions. 7 They subsequently sued the bus company and the
Birmingham Board of City Commissioners, charging, among other things,
that the signs violated the Constitution by designating seating according to
race.
Judge Harlan Grooms3 71 held that the racially designated seating did
not violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs because it did not con-
stitute state action. He emphasized that according to settled law the Four-
teenth Amendment constrained only governmental and not private deci-
sions involving race. According to Judge Grooms, the arrangement
challenged in Boman was that of a private business and thus "a matter
between the Negroes and the Transit Company." ' 2 In his view, the city
could no longer be charged with supporting segregation on the buses. The
new ordinance mentioned no racial discrimination on its face. Moreover,
the judge noted that "[tihe evidence wholly fails to reveal that [city offi-
cials] had formed any policy, actually or tacitly, to apply [the new ordi-
nance] in a racially discriminatory manner.31 73 He recognized that the
incident leading to the arrest of the plaintiffs arose only six days after the
enactment of the new ordinance, but concluded that this one incident
showed no pattern of discriminatory state action. The arrest, moreover,
368. 4 RACE REL L. REP. at 1028 n.1.
369. Id. at 1028.
370. A federal district judge described the scene as follows: "Plaintiffs, upon taking their seats in
the front portion of the bus, did nothing but sing and try to have a good time. There was no cursing,
disorder, loud, or boisterous noises while they were on the bus." Id. at 1029.
371. Judge Grooms, an Eisenhower appointee, was a committed segregationist. See J. PELTASON,
supra note 313, at 84.
372. 4 RACE REL. L. REP. at 1031.
373. Id.
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had been made without the knowledge or permission of the city commis-
sioners. True, the company's signs did perpetuate racial separation. But
the decisive point to Judge Grooms was that segregation remained intact
on the buses not because of any official action but rather because it was
desired by the company.
The district court's judgment was reversed by a panel of the Fifth Cir-
cuit that included the court of appeals' most progressive members on mat-
ters of race-Judges Elbert Tuttle and John Minor Wisdom-and its
most reactionary member-Judge Ben F. Cameron. 74 Over Cameron's
dissent,8 M Tuttle and Wisdom held that Birmingham was legally impli-
cated in the bus company's racial policy. While their opinion purported to
recognize the limits of the state action doctrine, it actually demonstrated
that doctrine's accordion-like pliability:
Of course, the simple company rule that Negro passengers must sit
in back and white passengers must sit in front, while an unnecessary
affront to a large group of its patrons, would not effect a denial of
constitutional rights if not enforced by force or by threat of arrest
and criminal action. Where, as here, the City delegated to its
franchise holder the power to make rules for seating of passengers
and made the violation of such rules criminal . . . we conclude that
the Bus Company to that extent became an agent of the State and its
actions in promulgating and enforcing the rule constituted a denial of
the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.318
This language can be read narrowly to embrace only those situations in
which municipalities expressly delegated to franchise holders the power to
make seating rules and explicitly criminalized infractions of such rules.
On the other hand, it could be read broadly to embrace any situation in
which a private bus company sought to enforce racial separation by call-
ing upon public police-the situation in which most bus companies and
374. Judge Ben F. Cameron was the most ardent segregationist on the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. He was a Mississippian who was appointed to the bench in 1955 by President Eisen-
hower under the sponsorship of the long-time Chair of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee,
Senator James 0. Eastland. See J. BAss, supra note 313; J. PFLTAsoN, supra note 313; F. READ &
L. MCGOUGH, supra note 313.
375. Judge Cameron's dissent is an illuminating example of white, elite, segregationist thought in
the 1950's. Certainly one of its most interesting features is the assertion that segregation was good for
and desired by most reasonable blacks. According to Cameron, decisions subverting segregation
have not been in harmony with the thought and desires of the people, the vast majority of
whom, in both races, know that their common problems can best be worked out if they are left
alone to continue the unbroken improvement in relationships which has taken place in the last
eight decades. . . . The rank and file of Negroes, realizing the hardship under which they
labor by reason of the head-start of several centuries enjoyed by white people, and proud of
their race and its accomplishments, resent the efforts of the agitators, who do not understand,
to confer a status upon them which is achieved and can only be maintained only under force of
the heavy hand of the law.
202 F.2d at 28-29.
376. See 280 F.2d at 535.
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other private businesses would find themselves if confronted by anti-segre-
gationist demonstrators. This, however, is not the place to explore state
action theory and the problem raised by so-called "private" racial discrim-
ination. That issue posed the main theatre of struggle in the next phase of
King's career, the phase memorably punctuated by the "Letter from a
Birmingham Jail," the "I Have a Dream" speech at the March on Wash-
ington, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For present purposes, the im-
portance of Boman resides in the vivid way it illustrates the recalcitrance
of the old order. Because of white resistance, the conquest of segregation
was forced to proceed inch by inch and issue by issue with exhausting and
embittering exactitude.
Montgomery and its aftermath teach lessons that reflect certain truths
about the Civil Rights Movement as a whole. One is that the Movement
wrought deep and lasting changes in the United States. Another is that
law, litigation, and lawyers played a significant and frequently praisewor-
thy role in accomplishing the Movement's aims. Certain currents in the
historiography of the Movement suggest that it may be useful to argue
self-consciously in favor of these propositions even though some observers
may well consider them obvious.
Some commentators resist the suggestion that the Civil Rights Move-
ment was largely successful. Their resistance derives from two sources.
One is a fear that emphasizing the success of the Movement will only
facilitate complacency in a political culture prone to self-congratulation.
The other is a bitter disappointment with patterns of income, housing,
education, health-care, and vulnerability to crime that remain racially dis-
parate. 7" Those who emphasize continuities in the subordinate position
of the Negro both before and after the Second Reconstruction, are often
willing to concede that the Movement succeeded in removing formal im-
pediments that prevented blacks from enjoying opportunities on the same
basis as whites. But they insist that that success was shallow, a boon only
to those blacks who possessed the wherewithal to walk through newly-
opened doors.37  King himself articulated this view late in his career,
377. See generally R. FARLEY & W. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND QUALITY OF LIFE IN
AMERICA (1987); J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); Hacker, American Apartheid,
N.Y. REV. (Dec. 3, 1987).
378. See, e.g., R. ALLEN, BLACK AWAKENING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA (1969). According to
Allen, "[p]erhaps the most significant indication of the middle-class nature of the civil rights move-
ment was the fact that it did absolutely nothing to alleviate the grim plight of the poorest segments of
the black population." Id. at 27. For a useful analysis of class dynamics within the civil rights move-
ment see J. BLOOM, supra note 33; see also Lewis, The Origins and Causes of the Civil Rights Move,
in THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, supra note 23, at 11 ("[U]ntil the mid-1960's, civil
rights politics was largely a middle-class affair. . . .There were good reasons why just plain folk
called [the NAACP] the 'National Association for the Advancement of Certain People.' "). Cf Chafe,
One Struggle Ends, Another Begins, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, supra note 23,
at 140 ("The primary feature of the 1970's and early 1980's has been an almost schizophrenic pattern
of progress and decline for former victims of discrimination, with those who are above a certain
economic level able to take advantage of the triumphs of the 1960's, while those below a certain
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questioning the value of having the right to buy a hamburger at a restau-
rant if one lacked the money to purchase it. 7 ' Others have even suggested
that the eradication of formal barriers coupled with the perpetuation of
substantive inequality has actually resulted in a net loss for blacks as a
group. 8 On the one hand, the demise of rigid, formalized racial barriers
have allowed the most resourceful blacks to "escape" confinement in all-
black institutions, depriving these potential bases of power of valuable tal-
ent and leadership. On the other hand, formal reforms in laws and prac-
tices have induced large numbers of whites (and a substantial number of
blacks as well) into believing that "racism is dead" and that, therefore,
any further difficulties experienced by blacks as a group is either "their
own fault" or indicative of incapacity.
As to the role of law, courts, and lawyering, the perspective against
which I argue views the legal apparatus as having been either largely
irrelevant-a mere recorder of results determined in other arenas-or
largely confining. 8" According to this perspective, the legal apparatus de-
radicalized the Movement by channeling powerful energies into readily
controllable, legalistic forms. This strand in the historiography of the
Civil Rights Movement is critical even of the lawyers who worked on
behalf of the Movement. Too often, the argument runs, the lawyers' ten-
dency was to subordinate the aspirations of their clients to the dictates of
legalism.
While I find much of value in this perspective on the Movement, the
thrust of my analysis is different in significant respects. First, I emphasize
that formal rights matter. What are now sometimes referred to as "mere"
formalities were anything but "mere" in the context that King confronted.
Negroes were willing to struggle to be called "Mr." or "Miss" or have the
right to sit anywhere on a bus because formal racial distinctions exercise a
symbolic power that is real, albeit subtle and nonquantifiable. Invidious
racial distinctions stigmatize those upon whom they are branded with
baleful consequences that ramify throughout the society, corrupting both
those who are privileged and those who are victimized. It does make a
difference-a huge difference-that largely because of reforms won by the
economic level have found the texture of their lives deteriorating to the point of resignation and
defeat.").
379. M. KING, WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? (1968).
380. See R. ALLEN, supra note 378; H. CRUSE, PLURAL BUT EQUAL (1987). One also detects
this message, albeit in nuanced form, in Professor Derrick Bell's influential writings. See D. BELL,
supra note 16; D. BELL, supra note 17.
381. See, e.g., K. BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY (1988); Moore, Brown v. Board of
Education: The Court's Relationship to Black Liberation, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO
DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS 62-64 (R. Lefcourt ed. 1971) ("The needs of Blacks are
fundamentally incompatible with the central role and function of the judicial system. . . When
Blacks look closely at American jurisprudence on questions of race, they find that little progress, if
any, has been made after generations of litigation."); Steel, Nine Men in Black Who Think White,
N.Y. Times Mag. (Oct. 1968).
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Movement, blacks are legally protected in the most significant domains
against invidious racial discrimination. It makes a difference even when
those laws are evaded and even to those who, lacking resources, cannot
take advantage of their rights. Frederick Douglass put it best in the course
of responding to those who suggested that the loss incurred by the partial
invalidation of the Civil Rights Act of 1875382 was of little real signifi-
cance because the bill could not be enforced anyway. "There is some truth
in all this," Douglass observed, "but it is not the whole truth. [The Act]
like all advance legislation, was a banner on the outer wall of American
liberty, a noble moral standard, uplifted for the education of the American
people. There are tongues in trees, books, in the running of
brooks,-sermons in stones. This law, though dead, did speak."3 8 The
law created by the pressure of the Civil Rights Movement also speaks, has
widely been heard, and is still very much alive.
There are hard empirical facts that can be marshalled to support the
proposition that in terms of employment, voting, and education, the
Movement effected a remarkable transformation in the power and oppor-
tunities available to black Americans. 8 " That proposition is not defeated
by pointing out that more affluent blacks have been the ones most able to
benefit from the demise of formal racial restrictions. First, in at least some
notable contexts, the poorer sectors of black communities were the ones
most directly benefitted by desegregation; prior to the struggle in Mont-
gomery, middle-class blacks had avoided Jim Crow seating by driving
their own cars.38 5
Second, those who deprecate the accomplishments of the Movement by
reference to the consistently dismal state of the black underclass measure
the Movement by indicia that fail to correspond to its primary aim. The
central goal of the Civil Rights Movement was to eradicate racial barriers
that impeded the aspirations of blacks. Over time, some Movement lead-
ers, including King himself, became increasingly aware of the intimate
relationship between racial and socio-economic impediments and tried to
broaden and reorient the Movement's aims;388 indeed, some of the Move-
382. The loss referred to was the Supreme Court's invalidation of the public accommodations
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Contrary to
what some have believed, the Act was not a dead-letter but was invoked with enthusiasm by a consid-
erable number of black litigants. See Franklin, The Enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 6
PROLOGUE 225 (1974); Riegel, The Persistent Career of Jim Crow: Lower Federal Courts and the
"Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 1865-1996, 28 AM. J. LEG. HIsr. 17 (1984).
383. Douglass, The Civil Rights Case, speech at the Civil Rights Mass Meeting Held at Lincoln
Hall, Oct. 22, 1883, in 4 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 392, 401 (P. Foner
ed. 1955).
384. See, e.g., W. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1978). For a vivid and
succinct exposition of this point, see Chafe, supra note 378, at 140-41.
385. See C. JOHNSON, supra note 38.
386. Speaking in 1967, King maintained that racial oppression was closely, perhaps inextricably,
linked to class stratification:
The black revolution is much more than struggle for the rights of Negroes. It is forcing
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ment's personnel joined the "war against poverty." But for the most part
the Movement remained focused rather narrowly on racial as distinct
from class discrimination 887 and achieved in that concededly limited area
rather remarkable results.
Another reason for emphasizing, as I do, change over continuity, is that
the most impressive and consequential accomplishment wrought by the
Movement is now so often overlooked: the transformation of the con-
sciousness of millions of Americans, but particularly southern blacks.
38 8
The arduous, painful, and dangerous process of creating new rights and
exercising old ones forced blacks to confront not only their oppressors but
also themselves. More specifically, they were forced to confront and over-
come the inhibiting feelings of inferiority that oppression often breeds.
That is why to Martin Luther King, the primary importance of the
Montgomery Bus Boycott resided in its demonstration "to the Negro...
that many of the stereotypes he had held about himself are not valid." '89
In Montgomery, as in other locales, the act of attempting to change the
world broke the spell of Negro acquiescence.
Law played a central part in this as in other aspects of the Movement's
struggle. King and his associates met defeat of various sorts in the legal
arena. But much of the current thinking about law and its relationship to
the Movement unduly minimizes the benefits that blacks received through
their participation in state and federal judicial forums. Litigation served
as the Negro's most successful and aggressive form of political activity
throughout the first half of this century. And even after that activity was
supplemented by other forms of protest-boycotts, sit-ins, marches, ri-
ots-litigation continued to serve valuable functions apart from helping to
shape the legal issues at stake. Courtrooms provided one of the few con-
texts in American history in which a cadre of Negroes-the Movement's
black lawyers-bested whites in an intellectual-professional setting on a
consistent and highly-public basis. 90 When Alabama prosecuted King for
America to face all its interrelated flaws-racism, poverty, militarism, and materialism. It is
exposing evils that are rooted deeply in the whole structure of our society. It reveals systemic
rather than superficial flaws and suggests that radical reconstruction of society itself is the real
issue to be faced.
Quoted in Chafe, supra note 378, at 136; see also Rustin, From Protest to Politics, in THE RADICAL
PAPERS 347 (I. Howe ed. 1966).
387. For criticism of this feature of the Movement, see Kahn, Problems of the Negro Movement,
in THE RADICAL PAPERS, supra note 386, at 148; Rustin, supra note 386.
388. See, e.g., M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 172 (describing peculiar sadness many felt at trium-
phant conclusion of year-long bus boycott, "our twelve months of glorious dignity"); H. RAINES,
supra note 108, at 78 (describing how he felt during participation in sit-in demonstration, protester
recalls that "I probably felt better on that day than I've ever felt in my life").
389. See King, supra note 139, at 75, 76.
390. One can hear echoes of the cultural importance of this development in the militant insistance
of some commentators that black lawyers be given their due in histories of the struggle against racial
oppression. See G. McNFIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983); G. WARE, WILLIAM HASTIE: GRACE UNDER PRESSURE (1984); Ken-
nedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1987).
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violating the state's anti-boycotting statute, his attorneys transformed a
hostile courtroom into an empowering forum in which the target of state
power fared better politically than the state itself. Similarly invigorating
was Gayle v. Browder. To be sure, the judicial victory alone would not
have been nearly as significant without the mass boycott from which it
arose, for the boycott facilitated active participation on a scale impossible
for any lawsuit. At the same time, it is important to appreciate that with-
out the suit and the eventual support of the Supreme Court, the boycott
may well have ended without attaining any of its expressed goals, a result
that may have been cruelly discouraging. In retrospect, it appears that
King and the MIA reaped the best of both extra-legal protest and litiga-
tion, the grass-roots participation generated by the former and the official
legitimation bestowed by the latter.
The successes of the legal struggle helped to create a state of mind that
was absolutely essential to the Movement, a consciousness that King ar-
ticulated with more power and grace than anyone: a sentiment of right-
eous outrage. As Barrington Moore aptly observed:
People are evidently inclined to grant legitimacy to anything that is
or seems inevitable no matter how painful it may be. Otherwise the
pain might be intolerable. The conquest of this sense of inevitability
is essential to the development of politically effective moral outrage.
For this to happen, people must perceive and define their situation
as the consequence of human injustice: a situation that they need not,
cannot, and ought not to endure.391
By winning in court and forcing segregationists to go outside the law to
maintain their power, the Movement's litigators helped to erode the
facade of inevitability that surrounded the segregation regime and to cre-
ate the perception of a gap between right and reality, authority and
force. 392 Here it is useful to recall the speech with which King launched
the boycott in Montgomery. "We are not wrong," he told his listeners.
For "if we are wrong, then the Supreme Court of this Nation is
wrong."
393
391. B. MOORE, JR., INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASES OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT 459 (1978);
see also Levin, Education and Earnings of Blacks and the Brown Decision, in HAVE WE OVER-
COME? RACE RELATIONS SINCE BROWN 110-11 (M. Namorato ed. 1979).
392. Commenting on the effects of Brown and other legal reforms, Judge Robert Carter notes:
[T]he psychological dimensions of America's race relations problem were completely recast.
Blacks were no longer supplicants seeking, pleading, begging to be treated as full-fledged
members of the human race. . . . They were entitled to equal treatment as a right under the
law; when such treatment was denied, they were being deprived-in fact robbed-of what was
legally theirs. As a result, the Negro was propelled into a stance of insistent militancy.
Quoted in D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMaICAN LAW 461 (1st ed. 1973). On the importance of
courts in the shaping of consciousness, see Note, Judicial Right Declaration and Entrenched Dis-
crimination, 94 YALE L.J. 1741 (1984).
393. See supra text accompanying note 4.
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The boycott made black Montgomerians aware of themselves as a com-
munity with obligations and capacities to which they and others had pre-
viously been blind. On the eve of the boycott, few would have imagined
the latent abilities that resided within that community. The protest elic-
ited and clarified those abilities. On the eve of the boycott, few black
Montgomerians would have considered themselves as persons with impor-
tant political duties. The protest inculcated and enlarged their sense of
responsibility. Moreover, by publicizing their willingness and ability to
mobilize united opposition to Jim Crow practices, the protesters in Mont-
gomery contributed a therapeutic dose of inspiration to dissidents every-
where. Later developments would attest to the influence of the boycott as
a role model that encouraged other acts of rebellion. Participants in subse-
quent protests remember Montgomery as a distinct, encouraging
presence.3 94
With the whole world watching, black Montgomerians grew in stature
to fill the roles that fate and their own efforts had created for them. Indic-
ative of the community's growth was the steadfast support that enabled
Martin Luther King to emerge as the leader of the boycott movement.
Factionalism had previously crippled potential black leaders. During the
boycott, however, that problem was largely overcome."' Promoting King's
leadership constituted an achievement along another dimension as well.
For the support he received displayed not only an impressive unity but
also good judgment. King vindicated the tremendous investment staked
upon his ability to lead and represent the black dissident community of
Montgomery. He did so by recognizing not only the power but also the
limits of law. "The enforcement of the law," he later observed, "is itself a
394. See J. BLOOM, supra note 33, at 138-39 (The boycott "was the most important confronta-
tion of the decade .... It inspired blacks to challenge white supremacy elsewhere .... It became a
unifying point not only for blacks in Montgomery, Alabama, but for blacks across the nation.").
James Forman who became a leader in SNCC recalls the effect of the boycott on blacks he knew in
Chicago:
Some friends and I had spent hours and hours in the barber shops ... trying to talk people
out of these self-destructive attitudes, these self-fulfilling prophecies of 'we can't get together.'
When the Montgomery bus boycott came along, you could hear people in the barber shops
saying, 'Well, at least people in Montgomery are sticking together.'
J. FORMAN, supra note 24, at 85.
As for himself, Forman maintains that "[t]he boycott woke me to the real-not merely theoreti-
cal-possibility of building a nonviolent mass movement of Southern black people to fight segrega-
tion." Id.; see also S. CAGIN & P. DRAY, WE ARE NOT AFRAID: THE STORY OF GOODMAN, SCH-
WERNER AND CHANEY AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOR MIssIssippI 48 (1988); D.
MCADAM, supra note 33, at 233 (describing effect of Montgomery on participants in effort to register
black voters and organize freedom schools in Mississippi in the summer of 1964); H. ZINN, SNCC:
THE NEw ABoLMrrONIsrs 18 (1964); Chafe, supra note 378, at 113 (describing influence of Mont-
gomery on student sit-in movement). The Reverend Jesse Jackson acknowledged the extent to which
the Montgomery Bus Boycott continues to occupy a special place in the sentiments of many Ameri-
cans when he introduced Rosa Parks to the audience immediately prior to making his speech to the
Presidential Nominating Convention of the Democratic Party in July, 1988.
395. Unfortunately, after the boycott, old habits of self-defeating factionalism reemerged. See D.
GARROW, supra note 23, at 83-125.
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form of peaceful persuasion. But the law needs help." 8' He continually
provided that help by presenting to the nation in a most attractive form
the case for protest and against segregation. No one in his generation
would prove to be as talented as he in the art of public persuasion. And
no period in his illustrious career would prove to be more impressive or
consequential than the year of the boycott, what King once described as
"our twelve months of glorious dignity."' ' 7
396. M.L. KING, supra note 45, at 216.
397. Id. at 172.
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